State of Utah v. Kelly S. Barnhart : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
State of Utah v. Kelly S. Barnhart : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Philip L. Foremaster; Attorney for Appellant.
Eric A. Ludlow; Washington County Attorney; Wade A. Farraway; Deputy Washington County
Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Kelly S. Barnhart, No. 920357 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4303
BRIEF 
IT"" 
f* , ft i y 
K *' U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET m.J*£2££ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
KELLY S. BARNHART, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920357-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from the Fifth Judicial District Court 
of Washington County 
Honorable James L. Shumate presiding 
PHILIP L. FOREMASTER #1103 
247 Sugar Leo Road 
St. George, UT 84770-7944 
Attorney for Appellant 
ERIC Al LUDLOW #5104 
WashinAon County Attorney 
WADE A.JFARRAWAY #5069 
Deputy Vmshington County Attorney 
178 No^ rlh 200 East 
St. Geblge, UT 84770 
Attorn^fs for Appellee 
[&t 
FILED 
DEC 1 1992 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
KELLY S. BARNHART, J 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
| Case No. 920357-CA 
( Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from the Fifth Judicial District Court 
of Washington County 
Honorable James L. Shumate presiding 
ERIC A. LUDLOW #5104 
Washington County Attorney 
WADE A. FARRAWAY #5069 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
178 North 200 East 
St. George, UT 84770 
Attorneys for Appellee 
PHILIP L. FOREMASTER #1103 
247 Sugar Leo Road 
St. George, UT 84770-7944 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 3 
ARGUMENT 3 
CONCLUSION 9 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Statutes 
Utah Code Annotated 77-18a-l (1)(a) (1990) 1 
Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3 (2)(f) (1991) 1 
Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44 (1991) 1,3 
Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44.20 (1990) 4 
Cases 
Adams v. State. 697 P.2d 622 (Wyo. 1985) 6 
Garcia v. Schwendiman. 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982) 3,4,6 
Hughes v. State. 535 P.2d 1023 (Okla. Cr. 1975) 4 
Lopez v. Schwendiman. 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986) 6,7 
Richfield Citv v. Walker. 790 P. 2d 87 (Utah App. 1990) . . . 3,4,5 
7,8,9 
State v. Bugger. 483 P.2d 442 (Utah 1971) 4,5 
State v. Juncewski. 308 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1981) 5 
State v. Smelter. 674 P.2d 690 (Wash. App. 1984) 4 
Other Authorities 
Recent Developments. 79 Utah L.Rev. 191 (1987) 6 
i 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
KELLY S. BARNHART, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
| Case No. 920357-CA 
) Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 77-18a-l (1)(a) 
(1990) and Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3 (2)(f) (1991). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Was the Defendant, Kelly S. Barnhart, "in actual physical 
control of a vehicle" at the time of his arrest, as set forth in 
Section 41-6-44 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44 (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 23, 1992, a little before 9:00 p.m., Officer 
Bill Mathews of the St. George Police Department was dispatched to 
the parking lot of Lin's Thriftway (a supermarket located at on 
Bluff Street in St. George, Washington County, Utah) because of a 
report by Rod Orton (the owner/operator of Lin's Thriftway) of a 
suspicious vehicle in his parking lot after closing time (Tr. 6). 
Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Mathews approached a blue 1983 
Buick and saw the Defendant passed out behind the steering wheel on 
the driver's side of the vehicle. The officer noted that the keys 
were in the ignition. The Defendant later admitted that the had 
driven the vehicle to the parking lot. 
When the officer, through some effort, was able to waken 
the Defendant, he noticed that there was a strong order of 
alcoholic beverage coming from the Defendant, that his speech was 
slurred and his balance was poor. The officer then had the 
Defendant perform some field sobriety tests, which the officer felt 
he failed. At that conclusion of those tests Kelly S. Barnhart was 
arrested. 
At the jail the Defendant was asked to take a breath 
intoxilizer test, to which he consented. The result of that test 
was a blood alcohol level of .18 (Tr. 10). 
The Defendant admitted that he consumed two cans of beer 
prior to driving his vehicle to the Thriftway and seven more cans 
of beer while at the Thriftway (Tr. 5). The Defendant's girl 
friend arrived at the scene and it was her intention to take the 
car from the Defendant and drive it thereafter (Tr. 7). 
The Court, after hearing the stipulated facts, reading 
the reports entered into evidence, and hearing the arguments by 
both parties, found that the Defendant was in actual physical 
control of the vehicle, that he had a blood alcohol level of .18 as 
shown by an intoxilizer test, which is above the State of Utah 
legal blood alcohol limit of .08, that these events occurred in St. 
George, Utah, and that the Defendant was guilty of being in actual 
2 
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
pursuant to Section 41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 
(Tr. 20-10). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State of Utah argues that the Defendant was in actual 
physical control of a vehicle while he was under the influence of 
alcoholic beverages. The basis for this argument is that the 
Defendant was passed out in the driver's seat, that the keys were 
in the ignition, that the automobile was operable, and that the 
Defendant could have started and operated the vehicle at any time. 
The State also contends that the trial court's finding of the 
Defendant's guilt was proper and should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
As this Court is already aware, this case comes before 
the Court of Appeals on stipulated facts, and as this Court ruled 
in Richfield City v. Walker. 790 P.2d 87 (Utah App. 1990), this 
Court does not have to defer to the trial court's findings because 
the trial court's interpretation "becomes a question of law." Id, 
at 89. However, it is the position of the State of Utah that the 
trial court made no error in finding that the Defendant had "actual 
physical control of a vehicle," nor was the resulting guilty 
verdict in error. 
Both this Court in Richfield City and the Utah Supreme 
Court in Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982) place 
great weight on public policy and legislative intent. Garcia found 
that "[a]s a matter of public policy and statutory construction, we 
believe that the 'actual physical control' language of Utah's 
3 
implied consent statute should be read as intending to prevent 
intoxicated drivers from entering their vehicles except as 
passengers or passive occupants." 645 P.2d at 654. In the instant 
case, Kelly S. Barnhart drank two beers, got behind the wheel and 
drove to Lin's Thriftway where he drank seven more beers (which he 
brought with him) while he sat behind the wheel of the vehicle with 
the key in the ignition. It is obvious that the intent of the 
legislature is to thwart situations where persons get behind the 
wheel and do their drinking there. This is most evident by the 
enactment of the open container statutes as found in Section 41-6-
44.20, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
In fact, the Garcia court cited Hughes v. State. 535 P.2d 
1023 (Okla. Cr., 1975) which stated that "an intoxicated person 
seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle is a threat to 
safety and welfare of the public." It was also stated that the 
danger is less than actual operation of the vehicle but is still a 
risk. In fact Oklahoma court found that a "defendant when arrested 
may have been exercising no conscious volition with regard to the 
vehicle, still there is a legitimate inference to be drawn that he 
placed himself behind the wheel of the vehicle and could have at 
any time started the automobile and driven away." 535 P.2d at 
1024. That same inference can be made here where Barnhart could 
have, at any time before passing out, reached out and with a flick 
of his wrist started the motor and become the driver of a motor 
vehicle with the "propensity to cause harm." State v. Bugger. 483 
P.2d 442, 444 (Utah, 1971). 
This Court in Richfield cited State v. Smelter, 36 Wash. 
4 
App. 439, h,/4 P. 2d 690 (1984) (whi ch q u o t e s S t a t e v . J u n c e w s k i . JOS 
i Jl I | M .. f. L n d i n g I h a I 
[A]ctual physical control statutes have beei i 
characterized as "preventive measurefs]" which "deter 
individuals who have been drinking intoxicating liquor 
from getting into the vehicles, except as passengers," 
and which "enable the drunken driver to be apprehended 
before he strikes." 
790 I 2d at 9 3 Ii i the case before the Court, Barnhart was not a 
passenger, he was behind the wheel , In fact, he was the oi lly 
person in the vehicle at the time the offi cer arri 1 "ed Tli :li s became 
more obvious in a pre-arrest statement (found in the DUI Form 
admitted - :*rc evidence» . 'here BarnharT .;nc:: «iSK&a wnere the owi ler 
!
 « - . ' - • . • < ger seat' .ind 
saying, "Right ther* >t .\/ar^- » > -Here because he was 
the > - . / person . -\ r.e vehicle vhar important concerning this 
;;'„", !:i 1 t, t I Illi'Cf J I"! 
the passenger seat and : ^\ . i \ne crivrr * r, seat where he sat. 
In regards to * M ^, . <•• \ Richfield City this Court 
d be ker • .' : hpir 
vehicles except as passengers ,r passive occupants, and should be 
apprehended before they trike." 79 0 P. 2d at 92 In Barnhart, 
till], s (jubl ii. IJItj 1 u:y ; j as : n e d out when (• fi cer Mathews took an 
intoxicated Barnhart from behind the wheel where he sat with the 
key in tix* ignition. 
t Appellant argues that this Court should let Barnhart 
go because the law does .: ^ppi. The Appellee argues 
otherwise. \ppel lee : .; t s i fnui f i on f Bugger 
is analogous with the Barnhart case. In Bugger, the Defendant was 
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in the back seat of the vehicle and had the car keys with him while 
he was parked off road. Recent Developments. 79 Utah L.Rev. 191, 
193 (1987) . Barnhart, on the other hand, was behind the wheel, the 
keys were in the ignition, and the vehicle was parked in a parking 
lot from which he could have driven and endangered many innocent 
persons almost immediately upon turning the key in the ignition. 
In Garcia the Utah Supreme Court found "actual physical 
control" where an individual whose car was blocked between another 
vehicle and a fence tried to move the vehicle. Even though he 
could go nowhere, the court found he had control. In Barnhart 
there was nothing to prevent the Defendant from leaving the scene, 
which created a more dangerous situation than Garcia because 
Barnhart was in a position where he could have driven the vehicle 
and placed the public at large at extreme risk. 
In Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986), the 
Utah Supreme Court found that an individual who was found in a 
vehicle parked next to a phone booth, asleep, leaning on the 
vehicle's steering wheel, with the keys in the ignition, and in a 
vehicle which that defendant claimed would not start to be in 
"actual physical control" of that vehicle. That court stated that 
the cases finding "actual physical control" used "the premise that 
as long as a person is physically able to assert dominion by 
starting the car and driving away, he has substantially as much 
control over the vehicle as he would if he were actually driving 
it," thus relying on Adams v. State. 697 P.2d 622, 625 (Wyo. 1985). 
In Barnhart, the Defendant had the power to start the car and drive 
off at any time prior to passing out or upon awakening. 
6 
Lopez is similar to Barnhart, except for the fact that in 
Lopez the car was not world i ig - hp time of arrest In Barnhart 
the vehicle was operable at the- 7 : :.-<r r arrest and could have been 
d r i v e n at any time, creating a gxeater risk than that which existed 
in Lopez. 
The case which most closely resembles the fact situation 
of Ha i inlimi i 1 i f,:i Kichtield City • ^ o 
a Richfield motel seeking a roi oom was available „u he 
returned to his truck in the parking lot to sleep. That defendant 
w as .1 ater ci i scovei red :! i: 1 hi s tri lck by two 1 aw c ff i cers who e 
engine off, the head lights on, the keys i n the i gniti on, and the 
defendant asleep on the seat w:i th hi s head towards the passenger 
c lb] a i :i,l ::e t: c veil 1: :i :il ill Tt l e ::i i i s tail I t: . . . . \ 1 
respects except for the head lights and the locatic:'. : ;
 t- iu . 
Appellee contends that the ] I ghtc ire - mportar* n 
show a nexus with facts associated with a DUI. What :s mportant 
is chat cue defendant ;.ijru; Lllj,? i2±L, ' — eat 
under » blanket, was • ;. - \s serious :s t....jdt .... :.-.•• ^ ui;. ^ was 
Barnhart passed out sitting upright :t r behind the 
wheel - - . . . wij^ ~±d_ ^ , _„ 3 
be in "actual physical controi > ;. ^ur «TMJI: ..-. clear 
that he intendea - ; sleep i . : \ox in 3 tailing because we have 
nci !'iniin i I 
parked .-: grocer, tort 11 \ ing upright behind the whee; ith 
the keys in the ignition and with the opportunity to leave at any 
I: 'Line a f t e r he .iwo] :;::e. 
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Richfield City is also important because it creates a 
"totality of the circumstances" rule in determining "actual 
physical control." This Court found that: 
Relevant factors for making this determination include, 
but are not limited to the following: (1) whether 
defendcint was asleep or awake when discovered; (2) the 
position of the automobile; (3) whether the automobile's 
motor was running; (4) whether defendant was positioned 
in the driver's seat of the automobile; (5) whether the 
defend was the vehicle's sole occupant; (6) whether 
defendant had possession of the ignition key; (7) 
defendant's apparent ability to start and move the 
vehicle; (8) who the car got to where it was found; and 
(9) whether defendant drove it there. 
790 P.2d at 93. 
In Barnhart, in reference to item (1) , the Defendant was 
deemed to have passed out behind the wheel by the trial court, 
which is consistent with those who over-indulge in alcoholic 
beverages. In reference to item (2) , the car was in a parking lot 
which offered easy access to St. George city streets. Regarding 
item (3), the motor was not running; however, it only took a turn 
of the key already in the ignition to change that situation. Item 
(4) asks whether the defendant was behind the wheel, and the answer 
to this question is a resounding yes. As to condition (5) , the 
Defendant Barnhart was the only person in the vehicle. 
Circumstance (6) is also positive, in that the Defendant possessed 
the key because it was in front of him in the ignition and he had 
used it to drive himself to the Thriftway. As to item (7) , whether 
the Defendant could start the car and move the vehicle, the answer 
is yes. Had Barnhart not passed outf he was in a position to start 
and move the vehicle he was in. In reference to number (8), the 
car got to Thriftway by the Defendant driving it there. Finally, 
8 
whether the Defendant drove the 
vehicle there, the answer 
What this she*. 
circumstances, . r _* ; } * 
driving off -.-> sc a ,.<- awakened. 
res. 
"I-nl; a i i 1 ,» o ! 
. Barnhart "was capable of 
2d at 5* • Furthermore, 
luvt* i 1 hi* 
vehicle at its present position, the keys were in the ignition, and 
he could have awakened and driven off, which created "the potential 
f , i. Richfield City, Id. It i s q ui lie clear that the 
•'totality .. circumstances" show that the Defendant was :i i i "actual 
physical control" of a vehicle, as was foi n i< I 1 :>Y t:l „<= 1: . r 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee contends that the tri al court was correct i i i 
,ii la] • . - . coi i tr :)] I|"1 : f a 
vehi-.- • t.—, :, - : f w erdict be at firmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 j / ^ day of November, 1992. 
U --*X?4>L~^ 7^~~* 
WADE FARRAWAY 
DEPUTY WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNFV 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that foui: t:rue and accurate copies of the 
foreqoinq Brief of App • e ] ] ee wei: e ma:ii 1! ed, p ::>stage prepai d, t : • PI :i :ii Ill :ii j:: 
Il Foremaster, 247 Sugar Leo Road, St. George, IJT 84770-7944 this 
6CV day c November, 1992. 
UJ^^L^ 
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stricted solely to tort actions. Yet, no con-
clusive authority is cited for this conclu-
sion. Conversely, Art. 10, § 4, Wyoming 
Constitution, says _^ * * * [S]uch fund 
shall be in lieu of, and shall take the place 
of any and all rights of action against 
any employer * * *." (Emphasis added.) 
The majority imposes liability on the 
state to indemnify Befus by virtue of a 
"statutory indemnity contract." This con-
cept sounds like a mutation or hybrid. To 
my knowledge a "statutory indemnity con-
tract" has no legal basis. I do not feel the 
legislature in this state created such a con-
cept. Even if there was such a concept, I 
seriously doubt the legislature ever meant 
it to apply to a situation such as this. 
Obviously the holding in this case has 
doubtful ramifications for future applica-
tion. Furthermore, the "statutory indemni-
ty contract" invented by the majority can-
not be compared to an express or implied 
indemnity contract as discussed in Pan 
American Petroleum Corporation v. 
Maddux Well Service, supra. 
In his dissent in the Pan American case, 
Justice Raper disagreed with allowing a 
third-party claim for indemnity from the 
employer, stating: 
"The majority decision has rendered 
meaningless the concept of workmen's 
compensation that ' "[i]n adopting the 
new system both employees and employ-
ers gave up something that they each 
might gain something else, and it was in 
the nature of a compromise; * * *."' 
Stephenson v. Mitchell, ex rel. Work-
men's Compensation Department, 
Wyo.1977, 569 P.2d 95, quoting from 
Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke 
Company, 1918, 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981. 
What they got was: '* • * The right of 
each employee to compensation from 
such fund shall be in lieu of and shall 
could murder his employees and be absolutely 
immune from civil liability. Conversely, the 
heirs of a murdered employee could only collect 
worker's compensation. Parker v. Energy Devel-
opment Company, Wyo., 691 P.2d 981 (1984); 
and Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., Wyo., 
687 P.2d 885 (1984). 
take the place of any and all rights of 
action against any employer contribu-
ting as required by law to such fund in 
favor of any person or persons by rea-
son~of any such injuries or death/ § 4 
Art. X, Wyoming Constitution. 
"But now, through the employment of an 
artful manipulation of words, misdirec-
tion of legal hypotheses and disregard 
for the clear language of the constitu-
tion, the employer does not have the in-
surance he has paid for. The employee 
now may indirectly, through use of a 
third party go-between, obtain an addi-
tional recovery from the employer he 
could not obtain directly. When that is 
the case, then as observed by the trial 
judge, 'it appears the constitutional im-
munity is nearly at an end.'" Pan 
American Petroleum Corporation v. 
Maddux Well Service, supra, at 1226-
1227. 
For the reasons stated, I would affirm 
the district court's disallowance of Befus' 
claim for indemnification, as well as the 
Hamlin claims. 
(O !«YNUMB£RSYSUM> 
Donald Mark ADAMS, 
Appellant (Defendant), 
v. 
The STATE of Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff). 
No. 84-173. 
Supreme Court of Wyoming. 
April 9, 1985. 
Defendant was convicted before the 
Natrona County Court, Stephen E. David-
Under the circumstances of this case, how-
ever, the majority is not so solicitous of the state 
of Wyoming as an employer paying into the 
worker's compensation fund. Under the au-
thority of this case a plaintiff (Hamlin) can do 
indirectly what he could not do directly. He 
can use a straw man or conduit (Befus) and 
collect twice from the state. 
ADAMS 
Cite as 697 P.2d 
son, J., of being in actual physical control 
of his parked vehicle while intoxicated, and 
he appealed. The District Court of Natro-
na County, Dan Spangler, J., affirmed, and 
defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Brown, J., held that: (1) the element of 
"actual physical control" contained in stat-
ute making it an offense for any person 
who is under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor to have actual physical control of 
any vehicle, was not unconstitutionally 
vague, and (2) evidence was sufficient to 
support a finding that defendant was in 
actual physical control of his vehicle at the 
time of his arrest. 
Affirmed. 
1. Automobiles <s=>316 
The element of "actual physical con-
trol" contained in statute making it an of-
fense for any person who is under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor to have ac-
tual physical control of any vehicle, was 
not unconstitutionally vague. W.S.1977, 
§ 31-5-233(a). 
2. Statutes <3=>188 
Words of a statute are to be interpret-
ed in their ordinary, everyday sense unless 
a contrary interpretation is indicated in the 
specific statute. 
3. Automobiles <3=>332 
Where former statute merely made it 
an offense for anyone to drive while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor, new 
law which makes it an offense to "drive" or 
"have actual physical control" of any vehi-
cle was intended by the legislature to apply 
to persons having control of a vehicle while 
not actually driving it or having it in mo-
tion. W.S.1977, § 31-5-233(a). 
4. Automobiles <3=>332 
Legislative intent in enacting the "ac-
tual physical control" portion of statute 
making it an offense for any person who is 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor to 
drive or be in actual control of any vehicle, 
was apprehending the intoxicated driver 
before he could do any harm by operating 
motor vehicle. W.S.1977, § 31-5-233(a). 
v. STATE Wyo. 623 
622 (Wyo. 1985) 
5. Automobiles e=>355(6) 
Evidence that defendant was found un-
conscious and intoxicated in driver's seat 
behind the steering wheel of automobile 20 
feet off the highway with the keys in the 
ignition in the off position, the lights off, 
and the engine not running was sufficient 
to support finding that defendant was in 
actual physical control of his vehicle at the 
time of his arrest. W.S.1977, § 31-5-
233(a). 
Donald L. Painter, Casper, for appellant 
(defendant). 
A.G. McClintock, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. 
Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Ren-
neisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Terry J. Har-
ris, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael A. Bloni-
gen, Asst Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appel-
lee (plaintiff). 
Before THOMAS, CJ., and ROSE, ROO-
NEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ. 
BROWN, Justice. 
Appellant was convicted of being in "ac-
tual physical control" of his parked vehicle 
while intoxicated. He raises two issues on 
appeal: 
"I 
"Whether the element of 'actual physical 
control' contained in Section 31-5-233(a), 
W.S.1977, is unconstitutionally vague? 
"II 
"Whether there existed sufficient evi-
dence to support a finding that appellant 
was in 'actual physical control' of his 
vehicle at the time of his arrest * * V 
We will affirm. 
On May 17, 1983, at approximately 11:30 
p.m., appellant was found by Highway Pa-
trolman-Tom Chatt parked near Highway 
220 between Casper and Rawlins, at or 
near Milepost 75, with his vehicle off the 
right side of the highway about 20 feet. 
The engine was not running, none of the 
624 Wyo. 697 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
lights were on, and the keys were in the 
ignition but in the off position. Appellant 
was unconscious and intoxicated. He was 
in the driver's seatrbehind th£~steering 
wheel. 
When Officer Chatt arrived, appellant 
did not respond to audible stimuli but did 
awaken when shaken by the officer. Offi-
cer Chatt characterized appellant's conduct 
and bearing as a "little bit unsteady," but 
he did not stumble. His speech was either 
"slightly slurred" or "slightly slow 
speech." At times appellant appeared con-
fused, but was at all times courteous and 
cooperative. Appellant stipulated that his 
blood alcohol reading was .152 shortly af-
ter his arrest, and the degree of his intoxi-
cation was not an issue at trial, nor is it an 
issue on appeal. 
Appellant was charged with being in "ac-
tual physical control" of a motor vehicle 
while in an intoxicated condition which ren-
dered him incapable of safely operating 
such vehicle. He was charged with violat-
ing § 31-5-233(a), W.S.1977, 1983 Cum. 
Supp.: 
"It is unlawful for any person who is 
under the influence of intoxicating li-
quor, to a degree which renders him in-
capable of safely driving a motor vehicle, 
to drive or have actual physical control of 
any vehicle within this state." l 
Appellant was tried by the Honorable 
Stephen E. Davidson, Natrona County 
Judge, sitting without a jury, and found 
guilty. His conviction was affirmed by the 
district court sitting as an intermediate ap-
pellate court. 
I 
[1] Appellant contends that the words 
"actual physical control," contained in 
§ 31-5-233(a), W.S.1977, are unconstitu-
tionally vague and ambiguous. He did not 
designate a constitutional issue on appeal, 
nor was it raised in the courts below. Ap-
pellant merely states in his brief that the 
statute is unconstitutional but he cites no 
authority. We have not had an occasion to 
consider the constitutionality of § 31-5-
233(a). However, other states have ad-
dressed the constitutional challenge that j s 
now before us. 
In 1-956, Montana had a provision in its 
statute which utilized the term "actual 
physical control" in almost the identical 
manner as involved here. See § 32-2142(1) 
subd. (a) R.C.M.1947. The Montana Su-
preme Court held that the statute was "nei-
ther vague nor uncertain." State v. Ruo-
na, 133 Mont. 243, 321 P.2d 615 (1958). 
The court stated: 
" * * * Using the term in 'actual physi-
cal control' in its composite sense, it 
means 'existing' or 'present bodily re-
straint, directing influence, domination or 
regulation.' Thus, if a person has exist-
ing or present bodily restraint, directing 
influence, domination, or regulation, of 
an automobile, while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor he commits a mis-
demeanor within the provisions of [the 
statute]. 
[2] In arriving at the above definition, 
the Montana court interpreted the words 
"actual," "physical," and "control" in their 
ordinary meaning. This is consistent with 
the general rule that words of a statute are 
to be interpreted in their ordinary, every-
day sense unless a contrary interpretation 
is indicated in the specific statute. Wyo-
ming State Department of Education v. 
Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681 (1982). 
We are satisfied with the Montana Su-
preme Court's definition of "actual physical 
control," and are persuaded that such defi-
nition is applicable to the Wyoming statute. 
We hold, therefore, that § 31-5-233(a), 
W.S.1977, is not unconstitutional because 
of vagueness or ambiguity. See also Par-
ker v. State, Okla.Crim.App., 424 P.2d 997 
(1967). 
II 
[3] Before 1981, § 31-5-233(a), W.S. 
1977, made it an offense for anyone, who 
was under the influence of intoxicating li-
quor to a degree which rendered him incap-
able of safely driving a motor vehicle, to 
1. Now § 31-5-233(a), W.S.1977 (November 1984 Replacement). 
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drive any vehicle within the state. The 
legislature amended the statute in 1981. 
The word "drive" was retained, and the 
words "or have actual physical control of" 
were added in the disjunctive. Ch. 12, S.L. 
of Wyoming, 1981. 
We conclude that the legislature intend-
ed that the present law cover factual situa-
tions not covered by the earlier statute, and 
more particularly, that the legislature in-
tended that the law should apply to persons 
having control of a vehicle while not actual-
ly driving it or having it in motion. The 
new statute defines two different offenses, 
"driving a vehicle" while intoxicated and 
"having actual physical control of a vehi-
cle" while intoxicated. 
Appellant contends that there was no 
"actual physical control" under the circum-
stances of this case, that is, the vehicle 
lights were off, the engine was not run-
ning, the ignition key was in an "off posi-
tion, and the vehicle was off the road. 
Appellant cites the following cases to sup-
port his contention. Key v. Town of Kin-
sey, Ala.Crim.App., 424 So.2d 701 (1982); 
State v. Zavala, 136 Ariz. 356, 666 P.2d 456 
(1983); Garcia v. Schwendiman, Utah, 645 
P.2d 651 (1982); State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 
2d 404, 483 P.2d 442 (1971). 
Other jurisdictions have held otherwise, 
and we believe their determination more 
nearly comports with Wyoming public poli-
cy. The controlling facts in Hughes v. 
State, Okla.Crim., 535 P.2d 1023 (1975), are 
almost identical to the facts in the case 
here. In Hughes, the keys were merely in 
the ignition and the accused was uncon-
scious behind the wheel of his parked car.2 
The Oklahoma court found the accused to 
be in "actual physical control" of an auto-
mobile.3 The court there said: 
" * * * We believe that an intoxicated 
person seated behind the steering wheel 
of a motor vehicle is a threat to the 
safety and welfare of the public. The 
danger is less than where an intoxicated 
2. We learn some of the details of Hughes from 
Mason v. State, Okla.Crim., 603 P.2d 1146 
(1979). 
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person is actually driving a vehicle, but it 
does exist. The defendant when arrest-
ed may have been exercising no con-
scious violation with regard to the vehi-
cle, still there is a legitimate inference to 
be drawn that he placed himself behind 
the wheel of the vehicle and could have 
at any time started the automobile and 
driven away. He therefore had 'actual 
physical control' of the vehicle within the 
meaning of the statute. * * * " Id., at 
1024. 
An intoxicated person seated behind the 
steering wheel of an automobile is a threat 
to the safety and welfare of the public. 
The danger is less than that involved when 
the vehicle is actually moving; however, 
the danger does exist and the degree of 
danger is only slightly less than when the 
vehicle is moving. As long as a person is 
physically or bodily able to assert dominion 
in the sense of movement by starting the 
car and driving away, then he has substan-
tially as much control over the vehicle as 
he would if he were actually driving it. 
State v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d 338 
(1954); and State v. Ruona, supra. 
[4] We believe that the legislative in-
tent in enacting the "actual physical con-
trol" portion of § 31-5-233(a), W.S.1977, is 
apprehending the intoxicated driver before 
he can do any harm by operating a motor 
vehicle. Mason v. State, Okla.Crim., 603 
P.2d 1146 (1979); and Hughes v. State, 
supra. Furthermore, the statute is indica-
tive of public policy of the State of Wyo-
ming to discourage intoxicated persons 
from making any attempt to enter a vehicle 
except as passengers or passive occupants. 
Garcia v. Schwendiman, supra. 
[5] We believe there was sufficient evi-
dence in this case to support the trial 
court's finding that appellant was "in actu-
al physical control" of his vehicle at the 
time of his arrest. 
Affirmed. 
3. The applicable Oklahoma statute was 47 O.S. 
§ 11-902, which in pertinent part, is almost 
identical to § 31-5-233(a), W.S.1977. 
Amado B. GARCIA, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Fred C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief of Dm 
ers License Division, State of Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 17559. 
Suprt me Court of I Hal 
April 1 1<N> 
Motorist appealed from an order of the 
Second District Court, Davis County, Doug-
las L. Cornaby, J., affirming the Depart-
ment of Public Safety's administrative rev-
ocation of his driving privileges under the 
implied consent statute. The Supreme 
Court, Durham, J., held that where the 
motorist occupied the driver's position be-
hind the steering wheel of an automobile, 
with possession of the ignition key and with 
the apparent ability to start and move the 
vehicle, he had "actual physical control" 
under the implied consent statute, even 
though he might have been prevented from 
moving the vehicle by a fence in front and t 
parked car in the rear. 
Affirmed. 
1 \utomobiles 0=^144.2(9, 10) 
Showing that arresting officer had 
grounds to believe that person was in physi-
cal control of vehicle is not by itself suffi-
cient to support administrative license revo-
cation for refusal to submit to blood test, 
but Department of Public Safety must 
show that operator was in actual physical 
control of motor vehicle in addition to show-
ing that arresting officer had grounds to 
believe that operator was then under influ-
ence of alcohol; same burdens must be met 
in district court de novo review, U C.A. 
1953, 41-6-44.10(b) 
! \utomobiles ®=> 144.2(10) 
In contrast to prosecutions under criini 
nal statutes, driver's license revocation pro-
ceeding requires proof only by preponder-
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ance of evidence and not bevond reasonable 
doubt IT C A 1953, 41 6-44.10(b). 
3. Appeal and Error e» 1009(1, JI 
Standard for appellate review of factu-
il findings affords great deference to trial 
court's view of evidence unless trial court 
has misapplied law or its findings are clear-
ly against weight of evidence. 
1 \utomobiles <3=>144.1(1) 
"Actual physical control" language of 
implied consent statute should !>e read as 
intending to prevent intoxicated drivers 
from entering their vehicles except as pas-
sengers or passive occupants. I T A 195,], 
41-G-44.10(a). 
See publication Words and Phr ises 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Automobiles 0=144.1(1) 
Where motorist occupied driver's posi-
tion behind steering wheel of automobile, 
with possession of ignition key and with 
apparent ability to start and move vehicle, 
he had "actual physical control" under im-
plied consent statute, even though he might 
have been prevented from moving vehicle 
by fence in front and parked car in rear 
U.C.A.1953, 41-e-44.1(Xa). 
6. Automobiles <*= 144.1(1) 
Fact that motorist occupying drivers 
position in automobile might be physically 
obstructed from driving away does not pre-
clude license revocation under implied con-
sent statute. U f \ 19">3, 41 f> 4 4 10(a) 
7. Automobiles c=111.2((n 
To obtain license revocation under im-
plied consent statute, Department of Public 
Safety need not show that motorist actually 
intended to exert "actual physical control" 
over vehicle. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10(a). 
Richard \\ Hrann, U^deii, toi [ilunlitl 
and appellant 
I) i\id L Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Bruce M. 
Hale, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
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DURHAM, Justice: 
After a trial de novo, the district court 
affirmed the defendant's administrate e 
revocation of plaintiff Garcia's driving priv-
ileges. Plaintiff appeals from~the district 
court decision and contends that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the district 
court's finding that he was in "actual physi-
cal control of a motor vehicle" as contem-
plated by the Utah implied consent statute. 
At 6:00 p. m. on November 1, 1980, Offi-
cer Gerald Ecker responded to a distur 
bance complaint at an apartment complex 
in Sunset, Utah. When he arrived at the 
complex, Officer Ecker was met by a Mr. 
Varble, who had positioned his own vehicle 
behind the automobile of the plaintiff to 
prevent the plaintiff from backing out of 
his parking stall. A fence was located ap-
proximately three feet in front of the plain-
tiffs car. Officer Ecker testified that as he 
approached the Garcia vehicle, he observed 
the plaintiff alone in the vehicle behind the 
steering wheel in the "process of starting 
his motor vehicle" by attempting to turn on 
the ignition; the officer testified that he 
saw the keys in the ignition. While there 
was some dispute about whether or not the 
key was actually in the ignition, the district 
court found it "believable that the plaintiff 
had the keys in the ignition," and it is not 
disputed that he had the ignition key in his 
exclusive possession. Officer Ecker ob-
served that plaintiff was apparently under 
the influence of alcohol. A second police 
officer, Officer Gale, arrived at the scene, 
obtained the keys from the plaintiff and, 
after interviewing Officer Ecker and Mr. 
Varble, placed the plaintiff under arrest for 
being in actual physical control of a vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol 
The plaintiff refused to permit chemical 
tests of his blood or breath, and consequent-
ly received a one-year revocation of his 
driver's license after an administrative 
hearing by the Department of Public Safety 
pursuant to the authority of the Utah im-
plied consent statute, § 41-6-44.10, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953). This statute provides for 
revocation of a person's driver's license 
when he refuses to submit to chemical tests 
of his blood, breath or urine "for the pur-
pose of determining whether he was driving 
or in ulual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alco-
hol." _The statute's enforcement provision, 
§ 41-^6-44.10(b) U 0 A , requires that the 
arresting officer have reasonable grounds 
to believe that the arrested person has been 
driving or is in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle whilp undor the influence of 
alcohol. 
[1] The defendant argues that a show-
ing that the arresting officer had grounds 
to believe the person was in physical control 
of a vehicle is by itself sufficient to support 
an administrative license revocation. We 
disagree. This Court has previously recog-
nized two separate evidentiary burdens to 
be borne by the Department of Public Safe-
ty in a revocation proceeding The depart-
ment must show that an operator was "in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle" 
in addition to showing that the arresting 
officer had grounds to believe that the op-
erator was then under the influence of alco-
hol. Ballard v. State, Utah, 595 P.2d 1302 
(1979) 
[2] The same burdens must be met in 
the district court. The district court's juris-
diction, conferred by § 41-&-44.10(b) 
U.C.A., is limited to a trial de novo "to 
determine whether the petitioner's license is 
subject to revocation under the provisions 
of this act." In Ballard, supra, we charac-
terized the trial de novo as "civil and ad-
ministrative, the purpose of which is for the 
protection of the public." 595 P.2d at 1304. 
In contrast to prosecutions under criminal 
statutes, a license revocation proceeding re-
quires proof only by a preponderance of the 
evidence and not beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Since all other matters were re-
solved by stipulation, the single issue before 
the district court, and now before us, is 
whether the defendant proved by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the plaintiff 
was "in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle" its contemplated by the implied 
consent statute. 
GARCIA \. SCHWENDIMAN 
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[iij I he district court iound ufrom the 
totality of the facts and the circumstances 
that the [plaintiff] had actual physical con-
trol of the vehicle as required by the Im-
plied Consent Statute." The standard for 
appellate review of factual findings affords 
great deference to the trial court's view of 
the evidence unless the trial court has mis-
applied the law or its findings are clearly 
against the weight of the evidence. Paga-
no v. Walker, Utah, 539 P.2d 452 (1975); 
Reed v. Alvey, Utah, 610 P.2d 1374 (1980). 
The meaning of "actual physical control" 
is suggested by the structure of § 41-6 It 
10(a), which reads: 
Any person operating a motor \ th ick in 
this state shall be deemed to have given 
his consent to a chemical test or tests . . . 
for the purpose of determining whether 
he was driving or in actual physical con-
trol of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol . . . . [Emphasis 
added.] 
The u *' of the disjunctive "or" strongly 
suggests an intent to proscribe conduct be-
yond and different from driving or operat-
ing a moving vehicle.1 Thus, the standard 
in Utah for determining whether a person 
was "in actual physical control" of a vehicle 
is different from the standard used in 
states which have only "driving" or "oper-
ating" language in their statutes. State v. 
Daly, 64 N.J. 122, 313 A.2d 194 (1973), for 
example, relied upon by plaintiff, was de-
cided under a criminal statute with "operat-
ing" language and is not persuasive in this 
case. Of greater value is the case of State 
v. Ruona, Mont., 321 P.2d 615 (1958), in 
which the Montana Supreme Court, follow-
ing an earlier Ohio case, construed a crimi-
nal statute with the phrase "drive or be in 
actual physical control," and adopted the 
view that: 
. . . the statute defined two distinct of-
fenses, in "operating a vehicle," and "be-
ing in actual physical control of a vehicle" 
while intoxicated. 
1. As of 1967, § 41-6-44.10(a) U.C.A. simply" 
stated that "any person operating a motor vehi-
cle" was deemed to have given his consent to 
chemical tests. In 1969, a new subparagraph 
(b) was enacted which referred to tests "for the 
purpose of determining whether he was driving 
321 P.2d at 618. This conclusion was like-
wise reached in Walker v. State, Okl.Cr., 
424 P.2d 1001 (1967), where the Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals held that the use 
of the disjunctive in Oklahoma's statute 
resulted in two offenses, one being "to 
drive or operate" and the other being "to be 
in actual physical control" of a motor vehi-
cle. The language of Utah's implied con-
sent statute requires the same construction. 
A definition of "actual physical control" 
is contained in State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 
404, 483 P.2d 442 (1971). The statute in 
question there was § 41-6-44, which made 
it unlawful for any person under th» influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor "to drive or be in 
actual physical control of any vehicle within 
this state." In Bugger, the defendant was 
found asleep in his car, which was complete-
ly off the traveled portion of the highway; 
the motor was not running. This Court 
held that there was no actual physical con-
trol of the vehicle. "Actual physical con-
trol" was defined in its ordinary sense to 
mean "present bodily restraint, directing 
influence, domination or regulation." 483 
P.2d at 443. The Court found, on these 
facts, that the defendant was "not control-
ling the vehicle, nor was he exercising any 
dominion over it " Id. 
Acts short of starting the motor have 
been held to constitute actual physical con-
trol in other jurisdictions. In Hughes v. 
State, Okl.Cr., 535 P.2d 1023 (1975), the 
court found a defendant to have been in 
actual physical control of a vehicle when 
the vehicle was found improperly parked in 
a residential area. The defendant was in 
the front seat, the ignition key was in the 
ignition, and the motor was turned off. 
The court said: 
IL is our opinion that the legislature, in 
making it a crime to be in "actual physi-
cal control of a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor," in-
or was in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle under the influence ...,*' which is the 
same language found in the current statute. 
Thus, the Legislature appears to have deliber-
ately expanded the scope of the statute's cover-
age. 
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tended to enable the drunken driver to be 
apprehended before he strikes . . . . 
We believe that_an intoxicated person 
seated behind the steering wheel of a 
motor vehicle is a threat to the safety 
and welfare of the public. The danger is 
less than when the intoxicated person is 
actually driving a vehicle, but it does 
exist. The defendant when arrested may 
have been exercising no conscious volition 
wdth regard to the vehicle, still there is a 
legitimate inference to be drawn that he 
placed himself behind the wheel of the 
vehicle and could have at any time start-
ed the automobile and driven away. 
535 P.2d at 1024. The same public policy 
concern for prevention compelled a similar 
result in City of Cincinnati v. Kelley, 47 
Ohio St.2d 94,1 Ohio Ops. 56, 351 N.E.2d 85 
(1976). In that case an intoxicated motorist 
seated in the driver's seat of a legally 
parked car with his hands on the steering 
wheel and the keys in the ignition was 
found to be in actual physical control of his 
vehicle, even though the engine was off. 
The court held that the relevant city ordi-
nance provided for two separate offenses, in 
that it prohibited "operating or being in 
'actual physical control* of a vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol." (Emphasis 
in original.) From that initial premise, the 
court concluded that it should interpret the 
"control" offense in light of the apparent 
legislative purpose in defining an offense 
separate from "operating." 
The clear purpose of the control aspect of 
the instant ordinance is to deter persons 
from being found under circumstances in 
which they can directly commence operat-
ing a vehicle while they are under the 
influence of alcohol 
* * * * * * 
2. See, e.g., State v. Ghylm, N.D., 250 N.W.2d 
252 (1977) (purpose of statute to deter intoxi-
cated persons from getting into their vehicle 
except as passengers); State v. Beckey, 291 
Minn. 483, 192 N.W.2d 441 (1971) (purpose of 
implied consent law to aid enforcement of 
criminal drunk driving statute); State v. Hal-
vorson, Minn., 181 N.W.2d 473 (1970) (purpose 
to promote traffic safety); State v. Schuler, 
N.D., 243 N.W.2d 367 (1976) (purpose of "actu-
al physical control" statute is preventive) 
[T]he term "actual physical control," as 
employed in the subject ordinance, re-
quires that a person be in the driver's 
seat of a vehielo, IK hind the steering 
wheel, in possession of the ignition key, 
and in such condition that he is physically 
capable of starting the engine and 
causing the vehicle to move. 
351 N.E.2d at 87. That a preventive pur-
pose should be read into the "actual physi-
cal control" language is the opinion of a 
substantial majority of the jurisdictions in-
terpreting similar statutory language.2 
In a recent case, State v. Juncewski, 
Minn., 308 N.W.2d 316 (1981), the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota held that a defendant 
who had been found inside a pickup truck, 
seated behind and leaning against the steer-
ing wrheel was in "actual physical control" 
of the vehicle. While there was uncertain-
ty as to whether the motor was running, 
the court held that "[w]hether a motor 
must be running before a person may be in 
actual physical control is essentially a policy 
issue." 308 N.W.2d at 320. 
[4,5] As a matter of public policy and 
statutory construction, we believe that the 
"actual physical control" language of 
Utah's implied consent statute should be 
read as intending to prevent intoxicated 
drivers from entering their vehicles except 
as passengers or passive occupants as in 
Bugger, supra. Therefore, under the facts 
before us, where a motorist occupied the 
driver's position behind the steering wheel, 
with possession of the ignition key and with 
the apparent ability to start and move the 
vehicle,3 we hold that there has been an 
adequate showing of "actual physical con-
trol" under our implied consent statute. 
3. The testimony of Officer Ecker was that 
plaintiff had the key in the ignition and "was in 
the process of starting his motor vehicle." He 
later expressed the view that the plaintiff was 
having trouble doing so because of the degree 
of his intoxication, but nothing in the record 
warrants a finding that the plaintiff was physi-
cally unable to start the car, as would be the 
case with an unconscious or sleeping motorist. 
WILSON v. 
Cite as, Utah, 
[6] That the plaintiff might have been 
prevented from moving his vehicle by the 
fence in front and the parked car of Mr. 
Varble in the rear does not alter our conclu-
sion. In that respect, our decision comports 
with cases from other jurisdictions in which 
there was a physical obstacle preventing 
actual movement of the vehicle, but the 
courts nonetheless found actual physical 
control.4 The record in this case demon-
strates that plaintiff's automobile could 
have traveled at least a few feet if it had 
been put into operation. 
[7] Similarly, we find it unnecessary l*nr 
the department to show actual intent under 
the control provisions of the implied consent 
statute. Just as an intent to drive is in-
ferred from one's actual driving, so also 
may an intent to control a vehicle be in-
ferred from the performance of those acts 
which we have held to constitute aetu il 
physical control. 
The decision of tin di trirt ounl I il-
firmed. 
HALL, C. J., and STEWART, OAKS and 
HOWE, JJ., concur. 
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Q Ford WILSON and Marilee W. Wilson, 
et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
\. 
A Lin B. MANNING, City Recorder, ( it) 
ill Fruit Heights, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 17632. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 1, 1982. 
Petitioners brought action for a writ of 
mandamus commanding a city recorder to 
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submit a rezoning ordinance to a referen-
dum. The Second District Court, Davis 
County, Thornley K. Swan, J., denied the 
petition, and appeal was taken. The Su-
preme Court held that an unsigned minute 
entry did not constitute an entry of judg-
ment, nor was it final judgment for pur-
poses of applicable rules governing appeals. 
Appeal dismissed. 
\|)pt'.'tl tind Error c=-7S(l) 
An unsigned minute entry denying pe-
tition for writ of mandamus did not consti-
tute an entry of judgment, nor was it final 
judgment for purposes of applicable rules 
governing appeals. Rules Civ Proc , Rules 
58A(b, c), 72(a). 
( urtis ,1 Drake, Salt Lake Cit\, f<u plain-
tiffs and appellants,
 l 
D. Kent Norton, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and respondent. 
PER CURIAM: 
Petitioners brought this action for a writ 
of mandamus commanding a city recorder 
to submit a rezoning ordinance to a referen-
dum. The district court denied the petition 
in an unsigned minute entry accompanied 
by a certificate of mailing which directed 
counsel for the defendant to prepare an 
order conforming to the minute entry. 
However, no order appears in the record 
and apparently none was entered. The no-
tice of appeal states that petitioners appeal 
"from the minute entry entered in this ac-
tion 
An unsigned minute entry does not con-
stitute an entry of judgment, nor is it a 
final judgment for purposes of Utah 
R.Civ.P. 72(a). Utah R.Civ.P. 58A(b) and 
(c); Steadman v. Lake Hills, 20 Utah 2d 61, 
433.P.2d 1 (1967); Hartford Accident & 
Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135 
4. See, e.g., State v. Dunbany, 184 Neb. 337, 167 N W.2d 367 (IM76). 
N.W.2d 556 (1969); State v. Schuler, N.D., 243 
HUGHES v. STATE Okl. ] ()!>;$ 
Cite as, Okl.Cr., 535 P.2d 1023 
under influence of intoxicating liquor. 47 
rharlH, HUCiHhli \ \\\\t ll.inl Okl.St.Ann. § 11-902. 
The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee. 
No. M-75-174. 
Court of Criminal Appeals oi < >M ihoni i. 
May 13, 1975. 
Rehearing Denied June 5, 1975. 
Defendant was comicted in the Dis-
trict Court, Cherokee County, Lynn Burns, 
J., of actual physical control of motor ve-
hicle while under influence of intoxicating 
liquor, and he appealed. The Court of 
Criminal Appeals, Bussey, J., held that 
where defendant, when arrested, was be-
hind the wheel and could have at any time 
started it and driven away, he had "actual 
physical control" of automobile within stat-
ute proscribing actual physical control of 
motor vehicle while under influence of in-
toxicating liquor and that evidence sus-
tained conviction. 
Affirmed. 
! Automobi les C=332 
Legislature, in making it a crime to be 
in "actual physical control of a motor vehi-
cle while under the influence of intoxicat-
ing liquor," intended to enable police to ap-
prehend the drunken driver before he 
strikes. 47 Okl.St.Ann. § 11-902. 
/ Automobi les 0=^332 
Where defendant, when arrested, was 
behind the wheel of car and could have at 
any time started it and driven away, he 
had "actual physical control" of automobile 
within statute proscribing actual physical 
control of motor vehicle while under influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor. 47 Okl.St.Ann. 
§ 11-902. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Automobiles C=>355(6) 
Evidence sustained conviction of ac-
tual physical control of motor vehicle while 
An appeal from the District Court, 
Cherokee County; Lynn Burns, Judge. 
Charles Hughes, appellant, was convicted 
of the offeiTse of Actual Physical Control 
of a Motor Vehicle While Under the In-
fluence of Intoxicating Liquor; was sen-
tenced to thirty (30) days in the County 
Jail and fined in the amount of One Hun-
dred ($100.00) dollars, and appeals. Judg-
ment and sentence affirmed. 
John T. Lawson, Tahlequah, for appel-
lant. 
Larry Derryberry, Atty. Gen., Michael 
Jackson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. 
OPINION 
BUSSEY, Judge: 
Appellant, Charles Hughes, hereinafter 
referred to as defendant, was charged, 
tried and convicted in the District Court, 
Cherokee County, Case No. CRM-73-3S9, 
for the crime of Actual Physical Control 
of a Motor Vehicle While Under the In-
fluence of Intoxicating Liquor (47 O.S. § 
11-902). His punishment was fixed at a 
term of thirty (30) days in the County jail 
and a fine of One Hundred ($100.00) dol-
lars. From said judgment and sentence, a 
timely appeal has been perfected to this 
Court. 
Briefly stated, the facts are that on Sep-
tember 3, 1973, at approximately 9:00 p. 
m , Don Fields, a trooper for the Okla-
homa Highway Patrol, was called to inves-
tigate an improperly parked vehicle in the 
Sharon Hills Addition of Cherokee County. 
Upon arriving at the scene, he observed a 
1972 Buick, white over gold, sitting at a 90 
degree angle on the roadway. He ob-
served two people in the automobile. The 
deiendant-^was situated, in the front seat 
with his feet on the front floorboard un-
derneath the steering wheel and his head 
was down leaning towards the passenger 
side of the automobile. Trooper Fields 
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gained entry to the vehicle by arousing the 
defendant's son who was asleep in the back 
seat. The ignition key was in the ignition. 
After arousing the_ defendant,^Trooper 
Fields observed that the defendant was un-
stable on his feet, his speech was slurred, 
his eyes were bloodshot, and he smelled 
"very strong of alcoholic beverage." In 
Trooper Fields' opinion the defendant was 
very intoxicated. 
The defendant did not take the stand nor 
offer any evidence in his behalf. 
Defendant's sole assignment of error as-
serts that the evidence presented in this 
case was wholly insufficient to support a 
conviction of the crime of Actual Physical 
Control of a Motor Vehicle While Under 
the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor. 
In the case of Parker v. State, Okl.Cr., 
424 P.2d 997 (1967), this Court held in 
Syllabi two and three: 
"2. Actual physical control, as used in 
Title 47 O.S.A. § l l-902(a), means: ex-
isting or present bodily restraint, direct-
ing influence, domination or regulation 
of any automobile, while under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor. 
"3. If a person has existing or present 
bodily restraining, directing influence, 
domination or regulation of an automo-
bile, while under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor, he commits an offense 
within the provisions of the statute." 
In the case of State v. Wilgus, Ohio 
Com.Pl, 17 Ohio Supp. 34 (1954), in 
which the Ohio Supreme Court was 
construing a statute similar to the instant 
statute, that court held that the statute de-
fined two distinct offenses, "operating a 
vehicle," and "being in actual physical con-
trol of a vehicle" while intoxicated. The 
court further held that the control contem-
plated meant more than the "ability to stop 
an automobile," but meant the "ability to 
keep from starting," "to hold in subjec-
tion," "to exercise directing influence 
over," and "the authority to manage." 
[1] It is our opinion that the legisla-
ture, in making it a crime to be in "actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor," 
intended to enable the drunken driver to be 
apprehended before he strikes. As was 
stated in the case of State v. Harold, 74 
Ariz. 210, 246 P.2d 178 (1952): 
" . . . It appears to us to be even 
more important for the legislature to 
prevent operators of cars who are under 
the influence of intoxicating liquors or 
who are at the time driving recklessly 
and in wilful and wanton disregard for 
the safety of persons or property, from 
entering upon the highways and into the 
stream of traffic than to permit them to 
enter thereon and after a tragic accident 
has happened to punish them for maim-
ing or causing the death of those who 
are lawfully in the use of such highways. 
[2,3] We believe that an intoxicated 
person seated behind the steering wheel of 
a motor vehicle is a threat to the safety 
and welfare of the public. The danger is 
less than where an intoxicated person is 
actually driving a vehicle, but it does exist. 
The defendant when arrested may have 
been exercising no conscious violation with 
regard to the vehicle, still there is a legiti-
mate inference to be drawn that he placed 
himself behind the wheel of the vehicle 
and could have at any time started the au-
tomobile and driven away. He therefore 
had "actual physical control" of the vehicle 
within the meaning of the statute. We, 
therefore, find there was sufficient compe-
tent evidence to support the verdict. 
Finding no error sufficient to warrant 
modification or reversal, it is our opinion 
that the judgment and sentence appealed 
from should be, and the same is hereby, af-
firmed. 
BRETT, P. J. and BLISS, J., concur. 
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consider whether and under what circum-
stances recusal may be required in adminis-
trative adjudications when the specific pro-
visions of section 54=7-1.5 do-jiot apply.-
Plainly, having participated in a rule mak-
ing proceeding does not automatically pre-
clude a commissioner from participating in 
a later, properly conducted adjudication. 
We have considered the other issues 
raised and find their disposition unneces-
sary to the result. The Commission's rule 
is of no force and effect, and its order is 
vacated. The matter is remanded for pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
Jose Antonio LOPEZ, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Fred C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, Driver 
License Services, Utah Department of 
Public Safety, Defendant and Respon-
dent. 
No. 20112. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 12, 1986. 
Utah State Driver License Division re-
voked driving privileges of driver for peri-
od of one year. The Seventh District 
Court, Carbon County, Richard C. David-
son, J., affirmed the administrative deci-
sion. Driver appealed. The Supreme 
Court, held that: (1) statute providing for 
arrest of one "in actual physical control" of 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
and/or drugs was intended by legislature 
to protect public safety and apprehend 
drunken driver before he or she strikes and 
may not be construed to exclude those 
whose vehicles are presently immobile be-
cause of mechanical trouble, and (2) driv-
er's refusal to submit to breath test upon 
rumors that there had been incidents of 
tampering with breathalyzer in the past 
was nevertheless refusal, subjecting de-
fendant to license revocation. 
Affirmed. 
1. Automobiles <s=>144.2(9) 
In revocation proceeding, Driver Divi-
sion has burden to show that operator of 
vehicle was in actual physical control of 
motor vehicle and that arresting officer 
had grounds to believe that operator was 
under influence of alcohol. 
2. Automobiles <3>144.2( 10) 
In trial de novo, district court must 
determine by preponderance of evidence 
whether driver's license was subject to rev-
ocation for driving under the influence of 
alcohol. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10. 
3. Automobiles <2>144.2(3) 
Supreme Court's review of district 
court's determination as to whether driv-
er's license was subject to revocation for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol 
is deferential to trial court's view of evi-
dence unless trial court has misapplied 
principles of law or its findings are clearly 
against weight of evidence. 
4. Automobiles C=>144.1(1) 
Even if truck was inoperable at time 
that licensee was found sleeping in it and 
arrested, that would not preclude him from 
having "actual physical control" over truck 
so that his driver's license could be revoked 
if he had statutorily prohibited blood alco-
hol content. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10(1, 2). 
5. Automobiles <s=>349 
Statute providing for arrest of one "in 
actual physical control" of vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs 
was intended by legislature to protect pub-
lic safety and apprehend drunken driver 
before he or she strikes and may not be 
construed to exclude those vehicles are 
presently immobile because of mechanical 
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trouble. 
10(2). 
U.C.A.1953, 41-2-19.5, 41-6-44.-
6. Automobiles @=*144.2(10) 
District court's findings that vehicle 
had reached its point of rest under its own 
power and that licensee had failed field 
sobriety test, were supported by competent 
evidence, and would not be disturbed by 
Supreme Court. 
7. Automobiles <s=*144.1(l) 
Refusal to take breathalyzer test sim-
ply means that arrestee was asked to take 
breath test decline to do so of his own 
volition. 
8. Automobiles <3=>144.2(8) 
Whether or not driver's refusal to take 
breath test is conditional or reasonable 
makes no difference; result is still license 
revocation of one year. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-
44.10. 
9. Automobiles <S>144.1(1) 
Refusal to answer yes or no to request 
to taking breath test is still refusal, for 
purpose of license revocation. U.C.A. 
1953, 41-6-44.10. 
10. Automobiles <3=>144.1(1) 
Driver's licensee admitted that he had 
been requested to submit to breath test 
and that he had refused, invoking sanction 
of revocation of his license. U.C.A.1953, 
41-6-44.10. 
11. Appeal and Error <3>181 
Supreme Court will not review alleged 
error when no objection at all is made at 
trial level. 
Phil L. Hansen, (Lopez), Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Bruce M. 
Hale, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
PER CURIAM: 
The Utah State Driver License Division 
revoked the driving privileges of petitioner 
Lopez for a period of one year pursuant to 
U.C.A., 1953, § 41-6-44.10 (1981 ed.). Af-
ter a trial de novo, the trial court affirmed 
the administrative decision. Lopez appeals 
and contends: (1) it was error to find that 
Lopez was in actual physical control of his 
vehicle when he was asleep at the wheel 
and the vehicle was inoperable; (2) his re-
fusal to take a breath test was reasonable; 
and (3) it was error to allow testimony on 
Lopez's breath test refusal when Lopez did 
not know that he was under arrest. We 
affirm. 
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on March 18, 
1984, Officers Anderson and Schofield 
were separately dispatched to investigate a 
prowler report. En route, Schofield was 
flagged down by an individual who pointed 
to Lopez's truck parked by a public tele-
phone booth adjacent to Sunnyside City 
Hall. The truck's motor was not running. 
There were vehicle tracks from the pickup 
in the freshly fallen snow. When Schofield 
approached the truck, Lopez was sitting in 
the driver's seat with his head resting on 
the steering wheel. Schofield tapped on 
the window, assisted Lopez in opening the 
door to talk to him, and had to catch him 
when he fell more than stepped out of his 
truck. Schofield smelled alcohol on Lo-
pez's breath. Lopez was drooling, had 
very poor balance, and needed support to 
stand. When asked to produce a driver 
license, Lopez initially handed the officer a 
child's picture. Schofield removed the keys 
from the ignition and had to turn them to 
get them out. 
After Officer Anderson arrived, both of-
ficers asked Lopez to perform several field 
sobriety tests, which he failed. Lopez at 
one point stated, "Was I driving, I was just 
waiting for a phone call." Lopez was 
placed under arrest, handcuffed, and 
placed in the patrol car. Both officers tes-
tified that Lopez asked several times what 
he was arrested for. Officer Anderson 
then requested Lopez to submit to a breath 
test to determine the alcohol content in his 
blood. ~"Lopez responded, "I took your 
tests. I passed your tests." Lopez was 
transported to the sheriff's station, where 
he was again asked to submit to the breath 
test, was advised that he would be permit-
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ted to have an additional test administered 
by a physician of his own choice, and was 
warned that his refusal to submit to the 
test could result in revocation of -his license 
for one year. Lopez did not respond. 
At trial, Lopez stated for the first time 
that his wife had been driving the truck 
when the battery died. He had been wait-
ing in the truck for her to bring the car to 
tow the truck home. He admitted that he 
had not told the officers about any dead 
battery or dead car. He admitted that he 
understood that he had been arrested for 
driving while under the influence. Lopez 
also testified that he had refused the offi-
cer's request to take the breath test be-
cause he "didn't trust them" and that he 
had conducted the field sobriety tests well 
enough to prove that he had not been 
drinking. He also confirmed that he had 
been told that he would lose his license if 
he refused. 
From the evidence so adduced, the trial 
court found by a preponderance that there 
was probable cause to arrest Lopez, that he 
had been requested to take the breath test, 
and that he had been warned of the conse-
quences if there was a refusal. The court 
found the arrest proper because Lopez was 
alone in the car, had the keys to the ve-
hicle, "there were tire tracks leading up to 
the vehicle, the vehicle got there apparent-
ly on its own power," and Lopez had failed 
the field sobriety tests. 
[1-3] In a revocation proceeding, the 
Driver License Division has the burden to 
show that the operator of a vehicle was "in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle" 
and that the arresting officer had grounds 
to believe that the operator was then under 
the influence of alcohol. Garcia v. 
Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 652 (Utah 
1982); Ballard v. State, 595 P.2d 1302 
(Utah 1979). In a trial de novo, the district 
court must determine by a preponderance 
of the evidence "whether the petitioner's 
license is subject to revocation under the 
provisions of this chapter." § 41-6-44.-
10(2), supra; Garcia, 645 P.2d at 652. Our 
review of that determination is deferential 
to the trial court's view of the evidence 
unless the trial court has misapplied princi-
ples of law or its findings are clearly 
against the weight of the evidence. Id. at 
653. _ 
Lopez first argues that the Driver Li-
cense Division failed to meet the statutory 
requirements that he had "actual physical 
control" of the vehicle when he was arrest-
ed. Section 41-6-44.10(1) reads in perti-
nent part: 
Any person operating a motor vehicle in 
this state shall be deemed to have given 
his consent to a chemical test or tests of 
his breath, blood, or urine for the pur-
pose of determining whether he was driv-
ing or in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while having a blood alco-
hol content statutorily prohibited, or 
while under the influence of alcohol, any 
drug, or combination of alcohol and any 
drug . . . so long as the test is or tests 
are administered at the direction of a 
peace officer having grounds to believe 
that person to have been driving or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while having a blood alcohol content stat-
utorily prohibited, or while under the in-
fluence of alcohol, any drug, or combina-
tion of alcohol and any drug 
Lopez compares his situation to the facts 
of State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 404, 483 
P.2d 442 (1971), where the driver of the 
vehicle had parked his car completely off 
the road, had turned off the motor, and 
was sleeping. Nothing in that case indi-
cates that the driver was in the driver's 
seat at the time he was found and arrested. 
"Positioning in the driver's seat is an ele-
ment common to all of the cases that have 
found actual physical control of a motion-
less vehicle." State v. Smelter, 36 Wash. 
App. 439, 674 P.2d 690 (1984). See also 
Adams v. State, 697 P.2d 622 (Wyo.1985); 
Huges v. State, 535 P.2d 1023 (Okla.Crim. 
1975); but compare Bearden v. State, 430 
P.2d 844 (Okla.Crim.1967), where the driver 
lay unconscious on the ground beside his 
pickup truck. The courts upholding convic-
tions in these and similar fact situations 
start out from the premise that as long as 
a person is physically able to assert domin-
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ion by starting the car and driving away, 
he has substantially as much control over 
the vehicle as he would if he were actually 
driving it. Adams v. State, 697 P.2d at 
625. 
[4,5] Nonetheless, Lopez claims that 
his car was inoperable at the time of his 
arrest and that the statutory burden was 
therefore not borne by the Driver License 
Division as he was unable to start the car 
and drive it away. We note initially that 
Lopez first told this version of the events 
leading to his arrest when he took the 
stand in his trial de novo. No substantiat-
ing evidence was offered to buttress his 
assertion. Under the circumstances, the 
trial court may well have disbelieved him 
and given little weight to his testimony. 
Assuming arguendo that Lopez's truck 
was indeed disabled, jurisdictions with sim-
ilar statutes as ours have nonetheless 
found "actual physical control" of the driv-
er over the disabled car. The rationale was 
forcefully voiced in State v. Smelter, 674 
P.2d at 693: 
The focus should not be narrowly upon 
the mechanical condition of the car when 
it comes to rest, but upon the status of 
its occupant and the nature of the au-
thority he or she exerted over the vehicle 
in arriving at the place from which, by 
virtue of its inoperability, it can no long-
er move. Where, as here, circumstantial 
evidence permits a legitimate inference 
that the car was where it was and was 
performing as it was because of the de-
fendant's choice, it follows that the de-
fendant was in actual physical control. 
To hold otherwise could conceivably al-
low an intoxicated driver whose vehicle 
was rendered inoperable in a collision to 
escape prosecution. 
Citing Commonwealth v. Taylor, 237 Pa. 
Super.212, 352 A.2d 137 (1975). Utah's 
statute provides for the arrest of one "in 
actual physical control" of the vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol and/or 
drugs. That requirement was intended by 
our legislature to protect public safety and 
apprehend the drunken driver before he or 
she strikes, § 41-2-19.5; Garcia, 645 P.2d 
at 654; accord Ballard v. State, supra, 
and may not be construed to exclude those 
whose vehicles are presently immobile be-
cause of mechanical trouble. State v. 
Smelter, supra. 
[6] The trial court here found that 
there were tire tracks leading up to the 
vehicle, that the vehicle had to have 
reached its point of rest "apparently on its 
own power," and that Lopez had failed the 
field sobriety tests. Those findings are 
supported by competent evidence and will 
not be disturbed by this Court. 
[7-10] At trial, Lopez based his refusal 
to submit to a breath test upon the rumors 
that there had been incidents of tampering 
with the breathalyzer in the past. His 
retort to the officers at the scene was that 
he had taken the tests and passed them. A 
refusal simply means that an arrestee who 
is asked to take a breath test "declines to 
do so of his own volition." Cavaness v. 
Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (Utah 1979). Whether or 
not that refusal is conditional makes no 
difference. Id. Likewise, it makes no dif-
ference whether or not a refusal is reason-
able. The result is still a license revocation 
of one year. By the same token, a refusal 
to answer yes or no to a request to take a 
breath test is still a refusal. Beck v. Cox, 
597 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1979). Lopez admitted 
that he had been requested to submit to the 
test and that he had refused. No more 
was required to invoke the sanction of the 
statute. § 41-6-44.10(2), supra. 
[11] We do not reach the merits of Lo-
pez's claim that testimony on his refusal to 
take the breath test was inadmissible be-
cause he was not aware that he was under 
arrest. Lopez's counsel did not object, but 
actively solicited that testimony from Lo-
pez on cross-examination. This Court will 
not review alleged error when no objection 
at all is made at the trial level. State v. 
Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983). 
The judgment is affirmed. 
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arm or knife and retained only the general 
term "dangerous weapon," Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-302(l)(a) (Supp.1989), as do the stat-
utes setting forth the elements of other 
"aggravated" crimes, e.g., Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103 (Supp.1989) (aggravated as-
sault); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (Supp. 
1989) (aggravated burglary). We agree 
with the State that this change to conform 
the language of the aggravated robbery 
statute evinces the legislature's intent that 
the sentence enhancement provision apply 
uniformly to all aggravated crimes, includ-
ing aggravated robbery. 
Although it is unclear why the legisla-
ture amended section 76-6-302(1 )(a) in 1975 
to add the specific term "firearm" to the 
aggravated robbery statute, since robbery 
committed with a firearm was already cov-
ered by the general term "deadly weapon" 
retained in the subsection, we conclude that 
the amendment created no ambiguity over 
what penalty the legislature intended for 
robbery committed with a firearm. The 
legislature was merely increasing the de-
gree of a robbery committed with the enu-
merated instruments of violence. In its 
subsequent adoption of the enhancement 
provision for firearm use in the commission 
of a first degree felony, the legislature 
exercised its authority to determine that, 
because firearms are more dangerous than 
knives or other deadly weapons, their use 
was more deserving of enhanced punish-
ment See Angus, 581 P.2d at 994-95. 
Finally, Webb asserts that, even if the 
enhancement provisions of section 76-3-
203(1) are applicable to his aggravated rob-
bery conviction, the trial court erroneously 
imposed a total of six years as the term of 
enhancement. Based on the Utah Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the firearm en-
hancement statute as providing for a maxi-
mum enhancement term of five years, 
State v. Willett, 694 P.2d 601 (Utah 1984), 
the State concedes that the trial court erro-
neously imposed a six-year enhancement 
term. 
We, therefore, direct the trial court upon 
remand to reduce the enhancement sen-
tence for use of a firearm in the commis-
sion of the first degree felony of aggrava-
ted robbery from a total of six years to a 
total of five years. With this correction of 
the sentence, Webb's conviction is af-
firmed. 
BENCH, J., and J. ROBERT 
BULLOCK, Senior District Judge, 
concur. 
: KEY NUMBER SYSTEM V 
RICHFIELD CITY, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
James M. WALKER, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 890156-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 26, 1990. 
Driver was convicted in the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court, Sevier County, David L. Mower, 
J., of being in actual, physical control of 
vehicle while having blood alcohol level 
of .217'. Driver appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Garff, J., held that: (1) city ordi-
nance under which driver was convicted 
was consistent with statutes, and (2) driver 
was in actual, physical control of truck 
while he was sleeping. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law e=254.2, 260.11(3) 
Stipulated facts were not functional 
equivalent of findings of fact, and, thus, 
Court of Appeals was not required to defer 
to trial court's findings. 
2. Automobiles <s=>316 
Municipal Corporations @=3592(2) 
StaTutory prohibition against driving 
or being in actual physical control of ve-
hicle with blood alcohol content of .08% or 
greater as shown by chemical test given 
within two hours after alleged operation or 
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physical control was consistent with ordi-
nance that did not include language about 
chemical test within two hours; another 
provision of ordinance stated that blood 
alcohol level at time of alleged offense~was 
presumed to be at least equal to level de-
termined by chemical test within two hours 
of alleged driving or actual physical con-
trol. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-43, 41-6-44(1), 41-
6-44.5(2). 
3. Automobiles e=>316 
Municipal Corporations <s>592(2) 
Penalty provision of ordinance prohib-
iting driving under influence of alcohol was 
consistent with statute indicating that first 
violation was Class B misdemeanor; ordi-
nance permitted imprisonment for 60 days 
to six months and fine of $299 and merely 
contained longhand description of penalty 
for Class B misdemeanor. U.C.A.1953, 41-
6-43, 41-6-44(3), 76-3-201(1), 76-3-201(2), 
76-3-204(2); U.C.A.1953, 76-3-30(1978). 
4. Automobiles <s=>316 
Municipal Corporations <s=>592(2) 
DUI ordinance allowing only for mea-
surement of blood alcohol content of driver 
was consistent with statute allowing driv-
er's intoxication level to be determined by 
measuring alcohol content in breath or 
blood. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-43, 41-6-44. 
5. Municipal Corporations C=>592(1) 
Municipal ordinance need not be identi-
cal to controlling state statute to be con-
sistent with it. 
6. Automobiles C=>332 
Totality of circumstances must be con-
sidered to determine whether driver was in 
actual physical control of vehicle while 
driver was under influence of alcohol. 
U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44. 
7. Automobiles <£=>332 
Two of the more persuasive indicia of 
actual physical control while driver is un-
der influence of alcohol are how vehicle got 
to where it was found and whether defen-
dant drove it there. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44. 
!• John Fair Larson, Senior Juvenile Judge, sit-
ting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
8. Automobiles <£*332 
Relevant factors for determining 
whether driver was in actual physical con-
trol of vehicle while driver was under influ-
ence of alcohol include the following: driv-
er's sleep; position of vehicle; running en-
gine; driver's position in driving seat; ex-
istence of other occupants; driver's posses-
sion of key; driver's apparent ability to 
start and move vehicle; manner in which 
vehicle got to where it was found; and 
driver's operation of vehicle to where it 
was found. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44. 
9. Automobiles <s=>332 
Driver who was sleeping in truck was 
in "actual, physical control" while he was 
under influence of alcohol; although driv-
er's head was toward passenger door and 
engine was not running, keys were in igni-
tion, and headlights were on* driver had 
driven truck to its position in parking lot. 
U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Shelden R. Carter, Harris, Carter & Har-
rison, Provo, for defendant and appellant. 
Richard K. Chamberlain, Richfield, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
Before BENCH, GARFF and 
LARSON,1 JJ. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Defendant James M. Walker appeals 
from his conviction of being in actual physi-
cal control of a vehicle while having a blood 
alcohol level of .21%, in violation of Rich-
field City Ordinance 1983-2. We affirm. 
At a bench trial, the following facts were 
stipulated to by the parties. In the early 
morning hours of June 30, 1987, defendant 
drove to the Richfield Quality Inn, seeking 
a room. After being informed that there 
were no vacancies, he returned to his truck 
Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1989). 
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in the parking lot and went to sleep. Sub-
sequently, he was discovered by a Sevier 
County sheriffs deputy, who found defen-
dant's truck with the engine off and the 
headlights on. The doors were unlocked 
and the keys were in the ignition. Defen-
dant was asleep on the seat, with his head 
toward the passenger door and a blanket 
over him. Within thirty minutes of his 
arrest, defendant submitted to an intoxilyz-
er test that registered his blood alcohol 
level at .21%. 
Defendant does not dispute his intoxicat-
ed state. He contends that: (1) the Rich-
field City ordinance under which he was 
convicted is invalid, and (2) he did not have 
actual physical control over the vehicle.2 
[1] Because this matter was presented 
on stipulated facts, which are "the func-
tional equivalent" of findings of fact, we do 
not defer to the trial court's findings. Do-
ver Elevator Co. v. Hill Mangum Invests., 
766 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
Where the facts are not in material dispute, 
the interpretation placed thereon by the 
trial court becomes a question of law, 
which is not conclusive on appeal. Diversi-
fied Equities, Inc. v. American Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n, 739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987). 
VALIDITY OF THE RICHFIELD 
ORDINANCE 
Utah's present DUI statutes, contained 
in Utah Code Ann. title 41, were enacted in 
1983. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-43 (1983) 
requires consistency between state law and 
local ordinances: 
An ordinance adopted by a local authori-
ty that governs a person's driving or 
being in actual physical control of a mo-
tor vehicle while having alcohol in the 
blood . . . or that governs, in relation to 
2. In Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 652 
(Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
the language of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(10) 
(1953 as amended), "driving or in actual physi-
cal control of a motor vehicle," describes two 
distinct offenses: one, operating a "motor ve-
hicle, and the other, being in actual physical 
control of a vehicle. Although section 41-6— 
44(10) has since been repealed, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44 (1988) has comparable language, "op-
any of those matters, the use of a chemi-
cal test or chemical tests, or evidentiary 
presumptions, or penalties o"r that gov-
erns any combination of those matters, 
shall be consistent with the provisions in 
this code which govern those matters. 
Accordingly, Richfield City adopted all of 
the 1983 amendments to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44 (1983) in its city ordinance 1983-2. 
After 1983, the legislature enacted additional 
amendments to title 41 which were not 
explicitly adopted by Richfield City. De-
fendant contends that the Richfield City 
ordinance is invalid because it is now incon-
sistent with section 41-6-44. 
There can be no question that, at the 
time it was enacted, the Richfield City ordi-
nance was consistent with the statate. 
Therefore, the only question is whether 
Richfield City's failure to adopt subsequent 
amendments made its ordinance inconsist-
ent and, therefore, unenforceable. 
[2] We have examined both the statute 
and the ordinance and, although we agree 
that differences exist, we find that those 
differences do not amount to an invalidat-
ing inconsistency. 
First, defendant alleges that the 1987 
amendment to section 41-6-44 significantly 
and substantially alters the description of 
the offense, thereby leaving the Richfield 
City ordinance inconsistent and invalid. 
The version adopted by Richfield City, 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(1) (1983), states, 
in pertinent part, that: 
[i]t is unlawful and punishable as provid-
ed in this section for any person with a 
blood alcohol content of .08% or greater 
by weight . . . to drive or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this 
state. 
The 1987 amendment to section 41-6-44(1) 
added language stating that it is unlawful 
erate or be in actual physical control of a ve-
hicle." Following the reasoning in Garcia, we 
interpret section 41-6-44 to also describe two 
distinct offenses, operating a motor vehicle and 
beingjn_actual physical control. In the present 
case, the information only charged defendant 
with having "actual physical control of a vehicle 
with blood alcohol content of .08% or greater." 
It did not charge him with operating the vehicle. 
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for a person to drive or be in actual physi-
cal control of a vehicle with a blood alcohol 
content of .08% or greater "as shown by a 
chemical test given within two hours after 
the alleged operation or physical control." 
Utah Code Ann. §"41-6-44(l)(ar(1987)/ 
The nature of the offense and the prohibit-
ed conduct are not changed by this amend-
ment, which only further describes the con-
ditions that will result in a presumption of 
intoxication. 
In any event, these conditions were al-
ready included in another provision of the 
city ordinance. Section 2 of the ordinance 
adopted, by reference, the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.5(2) (1983), 
which states: 
If the chemical test was taken within two 
hours of the alleged driving or actual 
physical control, the blood alcohol level 
of the person at the time of the alleged 
driving or actual physical control shall be 
presumed to be not less than the level of 
the alcohol determined to be in the blood 
by the chemical test. 
Thus, the same presumption created by 
the 1987 amendment is created by combin-
ing this provision with subsection 1 of the 
ordinance. "Unless legislative provisions 
are contradictor}' in the sense that they 
cannot coexist, they are not to be deemed 
inconsistent because of mere lack of uni-
formity in detail." Salt Lake City v. 
Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671, 673 
(1938). Consequently, the ordinance is con-
sistent with the statute. 
[3] Second, defendant alleges that the 
1987 amendment conflicts with the ordi-
nance because Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44(3) (1987) indicates that persons 
convicted of a first violation are guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor, while the ordinance 
states that punishment shall be by "impris-
onment for not less than 60 days nor more 
than six months, or by a fine of $299," or 
both. Richfield City Ordinance 1983-2(1.3). 
"A municipal ordinance is not in conflict 
with a statute authorizing its adoption be-
cause of a difference in penalties." Salt 
Lake City v. Allred, 20 Utah 2d 298, 437 
P.2d 434, 436 (1968) (quoting 37 Am.Jur., 
Municipal Corporations, § 165). How-
ever, the penalty portion of an ordinance is 
void if it conflicts with the general state 
law governing the subject. 
Here," both the ordinance and the statute 
describe class B misdemeanors. The ordi-
nance merely contains a longhand descrip-
tion of the penalty for a class B misde-
meanor as set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-204(2) (1978), imprisonment "for a 
term not exceeding six months." There-
fore, it is not inconsistent with the statute. 
The ordinance also imposes a fine of up to 
S299.3 Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) 
(1978) allows a court, within limits pre-
scribed by statute, to sentence a guilty 
person to pay a fine, to be imprisoned, or 
both. Section 76-3-201(2) (1978) also al-
lows a court to include a civil penalty in a 
sentence. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-30 
(1978) allows a court to impose a fine of up 
to $299 for a class B misdemeanor. 
The punishment actually imposed upon 
defendant was a forty-eight hour jail sen-
tence and a $299 fine, plus a $250 assess-
ment for drunk driving school and victim 
restitution. Thus, defendant's actual pun-
ishment was consistent with the terms of 
both the ordinance and the statute. 
[4] Third, defendant contends that the 
statute and the ordinance are inconsistent 
because the 1987 amendment to section 
41-6-44 allows a person's intoxication level 
to be determined by measuring the alcohol 
content in either the breath or the blood, 
while Richfield City Ordinance 1983-2(1.1) 
only allows for measurement of blood alco-
hol content. Because the ordinance follows 
one of the two statutorily prescribed meth-
ods, it is consistent with the statute. 
[5] We conclude that the municipal ordi-
nance need not be identical to the control-
ling state statute to be consistent with it. 
In Kusse, the supreme court addressed the 
issue of discrepancies between state and 
municipal legislation, stating, " 'In deter-
mining whether an ordinance is in conflict 
with general laws, the test is whether the 
ordinance permits or licenses that which 
3. Subsequent amendments to the Utah Code have increased the potential fine to $1,000. 
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the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice 
versa.' Judged by such a test, an ordi-
nance is in conflict if it forbids that which 
the statute permits." Kusse, 93 P.2d at 
673 (quoting State v. Carran, 133 Ohio St. 
50, 11 N.E.2d 245, 246 (1937)). Following 
this reasoning in Layton City v. Glines, 
616 P.2d 588 (Utah 1980), the supreme 
court also indicated that, "[t]he fact the 
municipal ordinance does not encompass all 
the proscriptions of the state regulation 
does not render it in conflict with that 
statute." Id. at 589. Because we find no 
conflicts or inconsistencies in the differ-
ences pointed out by defendant, we hold 
that the ordinance is valid. 
ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL 
Defendant claims that even if the ordi-
nance is valid, he should not have been 
convicted because he was not in actual 
physical control of his truck when he was 
found asleep inside it. 
Initially, we examine the public policy 
behind the laws prohibiting being in actual 
physical control of a vehicle while intoxicat-
ed: 
In general, laws prohibiting driving while 
intoxicated are deemed remedial stat-
utes, to be "liberally interpreted in favor 
of the public interest and against the 
private interests of the drivers involved." 
Specifically, actual physical control stat-
utes have been characterized as "preven-
tive measure[s]," which "deter individu-
als who have been drinking intoxicating 
liquor from getting into their vehicles, 
except as passengers," and which "en-
able the drunken driver to be ap-
prehended before he strikes." 
State v. Smelter, 36 Wash.App. 439, 674 
P.2d 690, 693 (1984) (citations omitted) 
(quoting State v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 
316, 319 (Minn.1981); see also State v. 
Webb, 78 Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d 338, 339 (1954); 
State v. Ghylin, 250 N.W.2d 252, 255 
(N.D.1977); State v. Schuler, 243 N.W.2d 
367, 370 (N.D.1976)). 
In Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 
(Utah 1982), our supreme court stated that 
[a]s a matter of public policy and statu-
tory construction, we believe that the 
"actual physical control" language of 
Utah's implied consent statute should be 
read as intending to prevent intoxicated 
drivers from entering their vehicles ex-
cept as passengers or passive occu-
pants 
Id. at 654. 
We, therefore, apply the law to the facts 
of this case in a manner consistent with the 
public policy that intoxicated motorists 
should be kept out of their vehicles except 
as passengers or passive occupants, and 
should be apprehended before they strike. 
[6] A review of the relevant cases con-
vinces us that we must look to the totality 
of the circumstances to determine whether 
defendant was in actual physical control of 
his vehicle. In State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 
404, 483 P.2d 442 (1971), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that an intoxicated motorist, 
asleep in his car, was not in actual physical 
control of his vehicle. The court recited 
Bugger's meager facts as follows: "The 
defendant was asleep in his automobile 
which was parked upon the shoulder of a 
road. .. The automobile was completely 
off the traveled portion of the highway and 
the motor was not running." Id. 
In Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 
(Utah 1986) (per curiam), the supreme court 
held that an intoxicated motorist, asleep at 
the wheel in his inoperable truck, was in 
actual physical control of his vehicle. It 
did not overrule Bugger but distinguished 
it, stating, "Nothing in [Bugger] indicates 
that the driver was in the driver's seat at 
the time he was found and arrested." Id. 
at 780. It concluded that "[positioning in 
the driver's seat is an element common to 
all of the cases that have found actual 
physical control of a motionless vehicle." 
Id. (quoting Smelter, 674 P.2d at 692); see 
also Fieselman v. State, 537 So.2d 603 
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988); State v. Peterson, 
769 P.2d 1221 (Mont.1989). Nothing in 
Bugger indicates that the driver was not in 
the driveFs seat at ffie time he was arrest-
ed. However, Lopez implies that Bugger 
was not behind the wheel, despite the fact 
that nothing in Bugger permits that as-
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sumption. Thus, positioning in the driver's 
seat is a significant but not necessarily the 
determining factor in ascertaining actual 
physical control. 
The Lopez court further found that 
where the lone occupant in a vehicle was 
positioned in the driver's seat, had posses-
sion of the ignition key, and had the appar-
ent ability to start and move the vehicle, he 
was in actual physical control. Although 
Bugger was silent as to other indicia of 
actual physical control, Lopez suggests 
that possession of the ignition key and the 
ability to start and move the vehicle are 
relevant factors.4 
[7] How the car got to its present rest-
ing place is an additional, critical factor. 
The Washington Supreme Court, in Smelt-
er, stated that: 
[the] focus should not be narrowly upon 
the mechanical condition of the car when 
it comes to rest, but upon the status of 
its occupant and the nature of the au-
thority he or she exerted over the vehicle 
in arriving at the place from which, by 
virtue of its inoperability, it can no long-
er move. Where, as here, circumstantial 
evidence permits a legitimate inference 
that the car was where it was and was 
performing as it was because of the de-
fendant's choice, it follows that the de-
fendant was in actual physical control. 
Id. at 693. The defendant in Smelter was 
found sitting behind the wheel of his 
stopped car, which had run out of gas on 
the shoulder of the highway. We agree 
with the Washington court that some of 
the more persuasive indicia of actual physi-
cal control are how the car got to where it 
was found and whether the defendant 
drove it there. 
Garcia suggests that "passive occupants" 
are, categorically, not in actual physical con-
trol of a vehicle in its statement that the in-
tent of the implied consent statute is to 
"prevent drivers from entering their vehicles 
except as passengers or as passive occupants 
as in Bugger." Garcia, 645 P.2d at 654. In 
4. The supreme court, in Lopez, found that our 
statute pertaining to actual physical control 
"may not be construed to exclude those whose 
an explanatory footnote, the Garcia court 
further states that "nothing in the record 
warrants a finding that the plaintiff was 
physically unable to start the car, as would be 
the case with an unconscious or sleeping 
motorist." Id. n. 3. This dictum does not 
further define a "passive occupant." Fur-
ther, because the driver was not asleep in 
Garcia, Garcia is factually inapposite to 
the present situation. Thus, we do not 
construe this language in Garcia as com-
pelling a determination that a driver is not 
in actual physical control of his vehicle 
based upon only the fact that he is asleep. 
Fiesclman v. State, 537 So.2d at 603, is 
factually identical with the instant case. 
Fieselman was charged with being in actu-
al physical control of a vehicle while under 
the influence of alcohol. He was found 
lying down, asleep, on the front seat of his 
car which was parked in a parking lot. The 
car's lights were on and the engine was not 
running. The Florida court determined 
that while these facts, alone, were insuffi-
cient to find that the defendant was in 
actual, physical control of the vehicle, the 
additional fact of the key found in the 
ignition was sufficient. Id. at 606. The 
court concluded, from the evidence, that: 
a reasonable inference can be drawn that 
Fieselman, while intoxicated, placed the 
keys in the ignition and thus was at least 
at that moment in actual physical control 
of the vehicle while intoxicated. 
We believe that such an inference can 
be drawn since a person who has placed 
keys in the ignition of a vehicle may be 
as much in actual physical control of the 
vehicle as a person seated behind the 
wheel of the vehicle. As the court recog-
nized in Griffin [v. State, 457 So.2d 1070 
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) ], a legitimate in-
ference to be drawn from the defen-
dant's sitting position behind the wheel is 
that the defendant "could have at any 
time started the automobile and driven 
away"; this inference is no less legit-
imate when it is drawn from the presence 
of the keys in the ignition 
vehicles are presently immobile because of me-
chanical trouble." Lopez, 720 P.2d at 781. 
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Lastly, we point out that evidence that 
the key was in the ignition does not 
inexorably lead to the conclusion that the 
defendant was in actual physical control 
of the vehicle. It is merely a fact—along 
with the defendant's presence asleep and 
intoxicated in the vehicle—which, being 
capable of establishing the defendant's 
actual physical control of the vehicle, 
precludes the conclusion that as a mat-
ter of law the defendant was not in actu-
al physical control of the vehicle 
Id. at 606-07. 
[8] In summary, we look to the totality 
of the circumstances to determine whether 
defendant was in actual physical control of 
his vehicle. Relevant factors for making 
this determination include, but are not lim-
ited to the following: (1) whether defen-
dant was asleep or awake when discovered: 
(2) the position of the automobile; (3) 
whether the automobile's motor was run-
ning; (4) whether defendant was positioned 
in the driver's seat of the vehicle; (5) 
whether defendant was the vehicle's sole 
occupant; (6) whether defendant had pos-
session of the ignition key; (7) defendant's 
apparent ability to start and move the ve-
hicle; (8) how the car got to where it was 
found; and (9) whether defendant drove it 
there. 
[9] In the present case, the following 
facts are relevant: defendant, the vehicle's 
sole occupant, was asleep in a prone posi-
tion on the seat with his head toward the 
passenger door. Although the vehicle's 
motor was not running, the keys were in 
the ignition and the headlights were on. 
Defendant had driven the vehicle to its 
position in the parking lot, from which it 
could easily be moved, and immediately 
returned to his truck upon learning that 
there were no vacancies at the motel.5 
5. Defendant's counsel proffered: 
Mr. Walker, in his testimony, would state that 
he approached the motel. He mera guest at 
that hotel leaving say, "It's full, you cannot go 
in. It's occupied." So Mr. Walker at that 
time turned around and went to his truck, put 
the pillow on the bench of the truck seat, laid 
down and went to sleep. 
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Whether defendant was asleep with his 
head on the steering wheel or stretched out 
on the seat, he would still be capable of 
driving off as soon as he awakened. Fur-
ther, if he had prior control and was re-
sponsible for the car being in its present 
position, especially if the keys were still in 
the ignition and the headlights were on, he 
is ready to go, and the potential for trage-
dy is present. It is this circumstance that 
the legislature specifically wanted to pre-
vent when it enacted laws prohibiting a 
driver from being in actual physical control 
of a vehicle while intoxicated. The legisla-
tive intent behind drunk driving laws is to 
protect the public by apprehending intoxi-
cated drivers before they kill or maim 
someone. This professed public policy de-
serves more than mere lip service. To fo-
cus exclusively upon the fact that the driv-
er was not sitting in the driver's seat or 
that he was asleep and to ignore other 
relevant factors, as defendant would have 
us do, is illogical. Thus, we conclude, un-
der a totality of the circumstances, that 
defendant was in actual, physical control of 
the vehicle. 
Defendant makes a compelling argument 
that intoxicated drivers should be encour-
aged to pull off to the side of the road to 
sleep it off.6 This approach is more appro-
priately the province of the legislature. 
See Fieselman, 537 So.2d at 606. If the 
legislature deems it desirable to encourage 
drinking drivers to pull off the road and 
refrain from driving while intoxicated, it 
could delete the words "or be in physical 
control of" to accomplish that purpose. 
We affirm defendant's conviction. 
BENCH and LARSON, JJ., concur. 
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
6. In State v. Peterson, 769 P.2d 1221, 1224 
(Mont. 1989), the Montana Supreme Court re-
jectedjjiis argument^ stating, "The better policy 
is that a person should ascertain his ability to 
dri\e before climbing behind the wheel and ter-
rorizing the roadways of this state." 
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den. In that case, however, the trial court 
dismissed the robbery charge on its own 
volition. That is not the case here. 
The District Attorney's office,^an arm. 
of the state, and under the direct super-
vision of the Attorney General (67-5-1), 
that is appealing here,—a somewhat un-
orthodox and inconsistent circumstance,— 
made the motion to dismiss the action, 
which at that point was as much an issue 
as Combs' restraint of liberty. It would 
seem that before this court orders the 
trial court to do much of anything the 
matter of that motion to dismiss and the 
resulting dismissal, all for a presumably 
good cause, should be resolved. 
In addition to the position I take on the 
aspect of this case reflected in the para-
graph immediately above, I urge that per-
haps we made a mistake in the remand 
portion of the McGuffey case and that we 
should overrule that part of it. The in-
stant case itself seems to point up the ad-
visability of so doing. To do anything 
more could lead us on safari in a civil 
proceeding down a road into an erstwhile 
juristic jungle of no return. 
O I KEY MUMBE1 SYSTEM 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Charles BUGGER, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 12278. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 6, 1971. 
Defendant was convicted in the Second 
District Court, Davis County, Thornley K. 
Swan, J., of being in actual physical con-
trol of his vehicle while under influence 
of intoxicating liquor, and he appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Tuckett, J., held that 
defendant who was asleep in his automo-
bile which was completely off traveled por-
tion of highway and whose motor was not 
running at time investigating officer 
awakened defendant and detected smell of 
alcohol was not in "actual physical control 
of a n y vehicle , , in violation of statute 
proscribing such behavior at time of his 
arrest. 
Reversed. 
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
Automobiles 0 3 3 2 
Defendant who was asleep in his auto-
mobile which was completely off traveled 
portion of highway and whose motor was 
not running at time investigating officer 
awakened defendant and detected smell of 
alcohol was not in "actual physical control 
of any vehicle'' in violation of statute 
proscribing such behavior at time of his 
arrest. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44. 
See publication AVords and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Robert Van Sciver, Van Sciver, Flor-
ence, Hutchison & Sharp, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant-appellant. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Lauren 
N. Beasley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff-respondent. 
TUCKETT, Justice: 
The defendant was found guilty of a 
violation of Section 41-6-44, U.C.A.1953, 
and from that conviction he has appealed 
to this court. 
During the night of July 28, 1969, the 
defendant was asleep in his automobile 
which was parked upon the shoulder of a 
road known as Tippet's Lane in Davis 
County. The automobile was completely 
off the traveled portion of the highway 
and the motor was not running. An officer 
of the Highway Patrol stopped at the scene 
and discovered the defendant was asleep-
With some effort the officer succeeded n1 
awakening the defendant, at which time trie 
officer detected the smell of alcohol an 
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arrested the defendant for being in actual 
physical control of the vehicle while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
The complaint charges the defendant 
with the violation of the statute above re-
ferred to which provides as follows: 
It is unlawful and punishable as pro-
vided in subsection (d) of this section 
for any person who is under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor to drive or be 
in actual physical control of any vehicle 
within this state. 
The defendant is here challenging the 
validity of the statute on the grounds of 
vagueness. However, we need not decide 
the case upon that ground. That part of 
the statute which states: "be in actual phys-
ical control of any vehicle" has been be-
fore the courts of other jurisdictions which 
have statutes with similar wordings. The 
word "actual" has been defined as mean-
ing "existing in act or reality; * * * in 
action or existence at the time being; 
present; * * *." The word "physical" 
is defined as "bodily," and "control" is de-
fined as "to exercise restraining or direct-
ing influence over; to dominate; regulate; 
hence, to hold from actions; to curb," 
The term in "actual physical control" in 
its ordinary sense means "existing" or 
"present bodily restraint, directing influ-
ence, domination or regulation."x It is 
clear that in the record before us the facts 
do not bring the case within the wording 
of the statute. The defendant at the time 
of his arrest was not controlling the ve-
hicle, nor was he exercising any dominion 
over it. It is noted that the cases cited by 
the plaintiff in support of its position in 
this matter deal with entirely different fact 
situations, such as the case where the driver 
was seated in his vehicle on the traveled 
portion of the highway; or where the mo-
tor of the vehicle was operating; or where 
the driver was attempting to steer the auto-
mobile while it was in motion; or where 
I. State v. Webb, 7S Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d 
33S; State v. Ruona, 133 Mont. 243, 
321 P.2d 615; Ohio v. Wilgus, Com.PL, 
he was attempting to brake the vehicle to 
arrest its motion. 
We are of the opinion that the facts in 
this case do not make out a violation of 
the statute and the defendant's conviction 
is reversed. We do not consider it neces-
sary to discuss the other claimed errors 
raised by the defendant. 
CALLISTER, C J., and HENRIOD 
and CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent. 
The statute formerly made it unlawful 
for a person under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor to drive any vehicle upon any 
highway within this state.1 The amendment 
added a provision making it unlawful to 
be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor. It removed the need to be upon a 
highway before the crime was made out 
and did away with the necessity of driving 
before a crime was committed. 
The reason for the change is obvious. 
It is better to prevent an intoxicated person 
in charge of an automobile from getting 
on the highway than it is to punish him 
after he gets on it. The amended statute 
gives officers a right to arrest a drunk 
person in the control of an automobile and 
thus prevent him from wreaking havoc 
a minute later by getting in traffic, or from 
injuring himself by his erratic driving. 
It does not matter whether the motor 
is running or is idle nor whether the drunk 
is in the front seat or in the back seat. 
His potentiality for harm is lessened but 
not obviated by a silent motor or a back-
seat position—provided, of course, that he 
is the one in control of the car. It only 
takes a flick of the wrist to start the motor 
or to engage the gears, and it requires only 
a moment of time to get under the wheel 
from the back seat. A drunk in control 
17 Ohio Supp. 34; Parker v. State (Okl. 
Cr.App.), 424 P.2d 997; 47 A.L.R.2d 582. 
I. Sec. 57-7-14, R.S.U.1933. 
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of a motor vehicle has such a propensity 
to cause harm that the statute intended to 
make it criminal for him to be in a position 
to do so. 
Restraining the movement of a vehicle 
is controlling it as much as moving it is. 
A person finding a drunk in the back seat 
of a car parked in one's driveway is likely 
to learn who is in control of that car if 
he should attempt to move it. A drunk 
may maliciously block one's exit, and in 
doing so he is in control of his own vehicle. 
I think the defendant in this case was in 
control of his truck within the meaning of 
the statute even though he may have been 
asleep. He had the key and was the only 
one who could drive it. The fact that he 
chose to park it is no reason to say he was 
not in control thereof. 
I, therefore, think that we should con-
sider the question which he raises in his 
brief as to the validity of the statute. 
Cases wherein an attack was made on 
statutes like ours have been decided in a 
number of jurisdictions. They hold the 
statute good. 
In the case of State v. Webb, 7S Ariz. 
8, 274 P.2d 338 (1954), the defendant was 
intoxicated and asleep in a truck parked 
next to some barricades in a lane of traf-
fic. An officer passed by and observed 
no one in the car. Later he returned and 
found the defendant "passed out." The 
statute made it a crime to be in actual 
physical control of a car while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor. The de-
fendant contended that the wording of the 
statute was not meant to apply to a situa-
tion where the car was parked and that it 
was only concerned with the driving of an 
automobile and other acts and conduct of a 
positive nature. In holding that the statute 
was applicable to the conduct of the defend-
ant, the court said: 
An intoxicated person seated behind 
the steering wheel of a motor vehicle is 
a threat to the safety and welfare of 
the public. The danger is less than that 
involved when the vehicle is actually 
moving, but it does exist. 
In the case of Parker v. State, 424 P.2d 
997 (Okl.Cr.App.1967), the appellant chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a statute 
making it unlawful for "any person who is 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
to drive, operate, or be in actual physical 
control of any motor vehicle within this 
state." There the defendant (appellant) 
claimed that the statute was unconstitu-
tional in that it was so vague and indefinite 
that a person charged thereunder would be 
deprived of due process of law. The court 
held that the statute did not violate any 
of appellant's constitutional rights. 
Under a similar statute the Montana Su-
preme Court in State v. Ruona, 133 Mont. 
243, 321 P.2d 615 (1958), held that the 
statute was not void for vagueness, and in 
doing so said: 
* * * Thus one could have "actual 
physical control" while merely parking 
or standing still so long as one was 
keeping the car in restraint or in posi-
tion to regulate its movements. Prevent-
ing a car from moving is as much control 
and dominion as actually putting the car 
in motion on the highway. Could one 
exercise any more regulation over a 
thing, while bodily present, than preven-
tion of movement or curbing movement. 
As long as one were physically or bodily 
able to assert dominion, in the sense of 
movement, then he has as much control 
over an object as he would if he were 
actually driving the vehicle. 
* * * * * * 
* * * [ I ] t is quite evident that the 
statute in the instant case is neither 
vague nor uncertain. * * * 
The appellant here claims some federally 
protected rights in that he says he was im-
properly arrested. It is difficult for me to 
see where that has anything to do with 
guilt or innocence. If he were improperly 
arrested, he would have an action against 
the officer for false arrest, but surely our 
courts have not lost contact with reality 
to the extent that we turn a guilty man 
free simply "because the constable may 
have blundered." 
PETERSON v. CONTINEN 
Cite as 4 
From what has been said above, there 
is absolutely no merit to this claim. By 
being in control of an automobile while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, 
the defendant wras guilty of a misdemeanor 
which was in the presence of the officer, 
and the officer had a right and a duty to 
arrest him.2 
The defendant was found guilty in the 
court below of being in actual physical 
control of his truck while he was under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor. He 
does not dispute that he was drunk. If the 
statute is good, we should not attempt to 
overrule the trier of the facts and find 
that the defendant was not the one actual-
ly controlling his truck. 
I would affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
23 Utah 2d 40S 
Irene A. PETERSON, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, a 
corporation, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 12187. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 29, 1971. 
Appeal by insurer from judgment of 
the Sixth District Court, Sevier County, 
Ferdinand Erickson, J., holding that de-
ceasea was covered by accident policy. 
The Supreme Court, Henriod, J., held that 
where farmer was working about idling 
farm tractor located on his private proper-
ty and it rolled forward and crushed him, 
he was "pedestrian" within policy covering 
injury "sustained in consequence of being 
struck by any land conveyance while a pe-
destrian." 
Affirmed. 
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
AL CASUALTY COMPANY Utah 4 4 5 
P.2d 445 
1. Insurance §=452 
Person on foot does not cease to be 
"pedestrian" within policy covering inju-
ries sustained while a pedestrian merely 
because he is not in motion. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Insurance C==452 
Where farmer was working about 
idling farm tractor located on his private 
property and it rolled forward and crushed 
him, he was "pedestrian" within policy 
covering injury "sustained in consequence 
of being struck by any land conveyance 
while a pedestrian." 
Thomas S. Taylor, of Chnstensen, Tay-
lor & Moody, Provo, for defendant-appel-
lant. 
Tex R. Olsen, of Olsen & Chamberlain, 
Richfield, for plaintiff-respondent. 
HENRIOD, Justice: 
Appeal from what was labeled a summa-
ry judgment for plaintiff which actually 
was a judgment on all available facts, un-
der an insurance policy covering injury 
"sustained in consequence of being struck 
by any land conveyance while a pedestri-
an." Affirmed, with costs to plaintiff. 
Believable evidence elicited under the 
discovery process indicates that plaintiff's 
farmer husband was crushed by a tractor 
that, driverless, had rolled down a rise, all 
of which occurred on his private property. 
The only question is whether the de-
ceased was a "pedestrian" under the terms 
of the policy. The trial court said he was, 
—a conclusion with which we agree,—no 
one questioning the fact that the tractor 
was a "land conveyance," and it appearing 
that the vehicle, out of gear, simply trav-
eled dowjihill as mentioned, and quite ob-
viously ran over the deceased. 
[1,2] Appellant indulges a non sequitur 
by assuming that coverage under the policy 
2. Sec. 77-13-3(1), U.C.A.1953. 
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band in the amount of $16,265.66. The 
judgment rendered in favor of Vera's estate 
on the creditor's claim against Sergey's es-
tate is affirmed. ' 
We remand to the trial court for entry of 
judgment against Beverly Scott and her 
husband, in accordance with this opinion. 
DURHAM and WARD WILLIAMS, JJ., 
concur. 
36 Wash.App. 439 
STATE of Washington, Respondent, 
v. 
Timothy J. SMELTER, Appellant 
No. 12793-4-1. 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 1. 
Jan. 11, 1984. 
After the defendant was convicted in 
the district court of being in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor, the Superi-
or Court, King County, Frank D. Howard, 
J., affirmed the judgment and sentence, 
and discretionary review was granted. The 
Court of Appeals,. Corbett, J., held that 
defendant, who was found intoxicated be-
hind the wheel of an automobile which was 
stopped, with its engine off and out of gas, 
partly on left shoulder of southbound lane 
of a major freeway, near several exits and 
gas stations, was in "actual physical con-
trol" of vehicle for purposes of statute mak-
ing a person guilty of being in actual physi-
cal control of a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor if he has 
actual physical control of the vehicle and .10 
percent or more by weight of alcohol in his 
blood as shown by chemical analysis of his 
breath, blood, or other bodily substance. 
Affirmed. 
1. Automobiles <§=>332 
The term "actual physical control," 
within statute making a person guilty of 
being in-actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor or any drug if he has actual 
physical control of a vehicle and .10 percent 
or more by weight of alcohol in his blood as 
shown by chemical analysis of his breath, 
blood, or other bodily substance, focuses not 
upon the mechanical condition of the vehi-
cle when it comes to rest, but upon the 
status of its occupant and the nature of the 
authority he exerted over the vehicle in 
arriving at the place from which, by virtue 
of its inoperability, it can no longer move, 
and encompasses those situations where cir-
cumstantial evidence permits a legitimate 
inference that the vehicle was where it was 
and was performing as it was because of 
the individual's choice. West's RCWA 46.-
61.504. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Automobiles <s=>332 
Defendant, who was found intoxicated 
behind the wheel of an automobile which 
was stopped, with its engine off and out of 
gas, partly on left shoulder of southbound 
lane of a major freeway, near several exits 
and gas stations, was in "actual physical 
control" of vehicle for purposes of statute 
making a person guilty of being in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor if 
he has actual physical control of the vehicle 
and .10 percent or more by weight of alco-
hol in his blood as shown by chemical analy-
sis of his breath, blood, or other bodily 
substance. West's RCWA 46.61.504. 
Powe, Hough, Bingham & Allen, Thomas 
W. Bingham, Seattle, for appellant. 
Norman K. Maleng, King County Pros. 
Atty., Scott McKay, Nicole Maclnnes, Dep-
uty Pros. Attys., Thornton Hatter, Senior 
Intern, Seattle, for respondent. 
CORBETT, Judge. 
Defendant, Timothy J. Smelter, appeals 
his judgment and sentence for being in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor. We affirm. 
A Washington State Patrol trooper ob-
served the defendant seated behind the 
wheel of an automobile which was stopped, 
with its engine off, partly on the left shoul-
der of southbound Interstate 5. The vehicle 
was out of gas. Based upon the officer's 
observations, the defendant was arrested 
and a breathalyzer test administered. At 
trial, the defendant stipulated that he had 
alcohol in his blood exceeding .10 percent by 
weight. The district court judge found that 
the defendant's automobile was reasonably 
capable of being operated and found the 
defendant guilty. The matter was heard by 
the superior court and the judgment and 
sentence affirmed. Discretionary review 
has been granted to determine whether a 
motor vehicle must be "operable" in order 
for an individual to be found guilty of vio-
lating RCW 46.61.504. The statute in perti-
nent part provides: 
A person is guilty of being in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
or any drug if he has actual physical 
control of a vehicle within this state 
while: 
(1) He has a 0.10 percent or more by 
weight of alcohol in his blood as shown by 
chemical analysis of his breath, blood, or 
other bodily substance made under RCW 
46.61.506, as now or hereafter amended; 
RCW 46.61.504. 
Defendant argues that actual movement 
of the vehicle is not an element of the 
offense, McGuire v. Seattle, 31 Wash.App. 
438, 442, 642 P.2d 765 (1982), but that the 
ability to move or operate the vehicle is. 
He contends that he was unable to move his 
vehicle because it was out of gas, and thus_ 
he was not in actual physical control of it. 
There are essentially three types of stat-
utes dealing with intoxicated persons and 
motor vehicles: those which prohibit "driv-
STATE v. SMELTER Wash. 691 
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ing" while intoxicated, those which prohibit 
"operating" a motor vehicle while intoxicat-
ed, and those which forbid an intoxicated 
person to be in "actual physical control" of 
a motor vehicle. Jacobson v. State, 551 
P.2d 935, 937 (Alaska 1976). Washington 
prohibits driving while under the influence, 
RCW 46.61.502, and being in actual physical 
control while under the influence. RCW 
46.61.504. An "operator or driver" is 
defined as one "who drives or is in actual 
physical control of a vehicle," RCW 46.04.-
370, the disjunctive formulation suggesting 
that two different types of activity are 
contemplated. 
While the verb "drive" is nowhere 
defined in the Washington Motor Vehicle 
Code, driving is the most restrictive of the 
three categories of activities, see State v. 
Purcell, 336 A.2d 223, 225 (Del.Super.1975), 
specifically requiring motion of the motor 
vehicle. County of Milwaukee v. Proegler, 
95 Wis.2d 614, 291 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Wis. 
App.1980). Generally, "to operate" includes 
a larger class of activities than "to drive"; 
one who drives a motor vehicle necessarily 
operates it, but the reverse is not necessari-
ly so. Jacobson v. State, supra at 937. 
While courts interpreting drunk driving 
statutes occasionally speak in terms of "op-
erating a motor vehicle," People v. Hoff-
man, 53 Misc.2d 1010, 280 N.Y.S.2d 169,170 
(Dist.Ct. Nassau County 1967), it has been 
stated with frequency that "operating a 
vehicle" and "being in actual physical con-
trol" define two distinct offenses. Cincin-
nati v. Kelley, 47 Ohio St.2d 94, 351 N.E.2d 
85, 86 (Ohio 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 
1104, 97 S.Ct. 1131, 51 L.Ed.2d 554 (1977); 
State v. Wilgus, 31 Ohio Op. 443 (Ct.Com.Pl. 
1945), cited in State v. Ruona, 133 Mont. 
243, 321 P.2d 615, 618 (1958); Crane v. 
Oklahoma, 461 P.2d 986, 988 (Okla.Cr.1969). 
No Washington case or statute defines 
"actual physical control" as the term is used 
in RCW 46.61.504. The question of actual 
physical control isr.according to WPIC 92.-
11, Comment, "an issue of law or at best a 
mixed issue of law and fact," and the dic-
tionary definition of the words "actual," 
"physical," and "control" may be used. The 
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formulation of the dictionary definition em-
ployed by the Supreme Court of Montana 
has been widely adopted: "Using the term 
in 'actual physical control' in its composite 
sense, it means 'existinjf~or 'presentlSodily 
restraint, directing influence, domination or 
regulation/" State v. Ruona, supra, 321 
P.2d at 618. Accord, Kansas City v. Trout-
ner, 544 S.W.2d 295, 300 (Mo.App.1976); 
State v. Ghylin, 250 N.W.2d 252, 254 (N.D. 
1977); Hughes v. State, 535 P.2d 1023,1024 
(Okl.Cr.1975); Commonwealth v. Kloch, 230 
Pa.Super. 563, 327 A.2d 375, 383 (1974); 
State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 404, 483 P.2d 
442, 443 (1971). 
Defendant claims that a vehicle operabili-
ty requirement is "clear" from a reading of 
State v. Ruona, supra, 321 P.2d at 618: 
As long as one were physically or bodily 
able to assert dominion, in the sense of 
movement, then he has as much control 
over an object as he would if he were 
actually driving the vehicle. 
However, the Ruona court, in distinguishing 
the offenses of "operating" and "being in 
actual physical control" of a motor vehicle, 
cited with approval a definition of "control" 
that meant more than the " 'ability to stop 
an automobile/" and included " 'the au-
thority to manage.' " State v. Ruona, supra 
321 P.2d at 618, quoting State v. Wilgus, 
supra. Actual physical control has else-
where been broadly defined as " 'exclusive 
physical power and present ability to oper-
ate, move, park or direct whatever use or 
non-use was to be made of the motor vehi-
cle at the moment/ " State v. Purcell, su-
pra at 226. Motion of the vehicle is not an 
element of actual physical control. 
McGuire v. Seattle, supra 31 Wash.App. at 
442, 642 P.2d 765. Accord, State v. Webb, 
78 Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d 338, 340 (1954); Kansas 
City v. Troutner, supra at 299; Common-
wealth v. Taylor, 237 Pa.Super. 212, 352 
A.2d 137, 139 (1975). Several courts have 
found defendants to be in actual physical 
control of vehicles whose motors were not 
running. E.g., State v. Ghylin, supra at 253 
(getting out of car in ditch, keys in hand); 
Slate v. Schuler, 243 N.W.2d 367, 369-70 
(N.D.1976) (seated in driver's seat of car in 
ditch, keys in ignition); Cincinnati v. Kel-
ley, supra 351 N.E.2d at 86 (seated in driv-
er's seat of parked car, keys in ignition). 
Only three cases have been brought to 
.our attention in which the court found no 
actual physical control of a motionless vehi-
cle whose motor was not running, and none 
is of aid to the defendant here. In State v. 
Bugger, supra 483 P.2d at 442-43, the court, 
applying the Ruona definition, found that a 
defendant who was asleep in a car parked 
completely off the traveled portion of the 
highway was not in actual physical control. 
The same result would obtain under RCW 
46.61.504, which specifically prohibits con-
viction of a defendant who has moved his 
vehicle safely off the roadway. In Bearden 
v. State, 430 P.2d 844, 845-47 (Okl.Cr.1967), 
the court found no actual physical control 
where the defendant was found lying un-
conscious at the side of the road, outside his 
vehicle. Positioning in the driver's seat is 
an element common to all of the cases that 
have found actual physical control of a mot-
ionless vehicle, and that is the position in 
which the defendant here was found. The 
court in Key v. Town of Kinsey, 424 So.2d 
701, 703-04 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), formulated 
the following list of elements of actual 
physical control: 
1. Active or constructive possession of 
the vehicle's ignition key by the person 
charged or, in the alternative, proof that 
such a key is not required for the vehi-
cle's operation; 
2. Position of the person charged in 
the driver's seat, behind the steering 
wheel, and in such condition that, except 
for the intoxication, he or she is physical-
ly capable of starting the engine and 
causing the vehicle to move; 
3. A vehicle that is operable to some 
extent. 
The defendant in Key did not meet these 
criteria because the car was out of gas, and 
his son, who had the car keys, had walked 
to get gas. There was also evidence that 
the son, and not the defendant, was the 
driver. Although the opinion is not entirely 
clear, it appears that the court was relying 
more on the absence of the ignition keys, on 
STATE v. SMELTER 
Cite as 674 P.2d 690 (Wash.App. 1984) 
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the issue of present ability to control the 
car, than upon the car being out of gas, in 
determining that there was no actual physi-
cal control by the defendant. Key, supra at 
704. The cryptic reference to operability 
was not explained, but it would appear to 
be compatible with the "reasonably capable 
of being rendered operable" standard em-
ployed by the trial judge in the instant case. 
A definition of "control" that focuses 
upon "the authority to manage" a motor 
vehicle, perhaps as evidenced by lawful pos-
session of the keys while seated in the driv-
er's seat, would permit a finding of actual 
physical control of an inoperable vehicle. 
The question of what constitutes the ele-
ments of actual physical control, such as 
whether the motor must be running or, by 
extension, whether the vehicle must be op-
erable, has been characterized as a policy 
issue. State v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316, 
320 (Minn.1981). In general, laws prohibit-
ing driving while intoxicated are deemed 
remedial statutes, to be "liberally interpret-
ed in favor of the public interest and 
against the private interests of the drivers 
involved." Id. at 319. Specifically, actual 
physical control statutes have been charac-
terized as "preventive measure[s]," State v. 
Schuler, supra at 370, which "deter individ-
uals who have been drinking intoxicating 
liquor from getting into their vehicles, ex-
cept as passengers," State v. Ghylin, supra 
at 255, and which "enable the drunken driv-
er to be apprehended before he strikes." 
State v. Webb, supra 274 P.2d at 339. 
[1,2] The "reasonably capable of being 
rendered operable" standard employed by 
the trial court here distinguishes a car that 
runs out of gas on a major freeway near 
several exits and gas stations from a car 
with a cracked block which renders it "to-
tally inoperable." The difficulty in at-
tempting to formulate a unitary standard 
of operability arises from the necessity of 
setting out the degree of inoperability 
which will preclude prosecution under RCW 
46.61.504. The focus should not be narrow-
ly upon the mechanical condition of the car 
when it comes to rest, but upon the status 
of its occupant and the nature of the au-
thority he or she exerted over the vehicle in 
arriving at the place from which, by virtue 
of its inoperability, it can no longer move. 
Where, as here, circumstantial evidence per-
mits a legitimate inference that the car was 
where it was and was performing as it was 
because of the defendant's choice, it follows 
that the defendant was in actual physical 
control. To hold otherwise could conceiva-
bly allow an intoxicated driver whose vehi-
cle was rendered inoperable in a collision to 
escape prosecution. Such a result was 
avoided in Commonwealth v. Taylor, supra 
352 A.2d at 140, in which the defendant's 
actual driving ended in a collision that sent 
his vehicle off the highway. He was seated 
on the driver's side after the crash, and the 
court noted that "it could be inferred that 
the car was where it was and the condition 
in which it was because of appellant's 
choice 'from which it followed that appel-
lant was in "actual physical control" and so 
was "operating" the c a r . . . . ' This 'physi-
cal control' continued in the appellant after 
the collision had immobilized his car." Id. 
In the instant case, extrinsic evidence 
that the defendant, while intoxicated, drove 
his vehicle until it ran out of gas, together 
with his admission of these facts, supports a 
finding that he was in actual physical con-
trol of his vehicle when apprehended. See 
State v. Ghylin, supra at 253-54 (fact that 
car was stuck in a ditch, coupled with de-
fendant's admissions that he was driving 
and other evidence, found to be sufficient 
evidence of actual physical control). Such 
an analysis finds support in the latest state-
ment on the subject by the Supreme Court 
of Montana, whose definition of actual 
physical control in State v. Ruona, supra 
321 P.2d at 618, has been widely adopted. 
In a case in which the defendant was found 
asleep behind the wheel of a motor vehicle 
which was stuck in a pit, the court applied 
the same analysis as employed in cases 
where a defendant is found asleep or passed 
out behind the wheel of a movable vehicle. 
Actual physical control is found in those 
cases on the theory that the defendant is in 
a position to regulate the vehicle's move-
ments, or has authority to manage the vehi-
cle: 
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Just as a motorist remains in a position to 
regulate a vehicle while asleep behind its 
steering wheel, so does he remain in a 
position to regulate a^vehicle while-asleep -
behind the steering wheel of a vehicle 
stuck in a borrow pit. He has not relin-
quished regulation of or control over the 
vehicle. It does not matter that the vehi-
cle is incapable of moving. 
State v. Taylor, 661 P.2d 33, 34 (Mont.1983) 
(emphasis added). 
Clearly, based on the circumstances of the 
defendant's apprehension and his own ad-
missions, the trial court did not err in find-
ing that the vehicle was reasonably capable 
of being operated or rendered operable and, 
therefore, that the defendant was in actual 
physical control of the vehicle. 
Affirmed. 
ANDERSEN, C.J., and DURHAM, J., 
concur. 
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36 Wash.App. 451 
STATE of Washington, Respondent, 
v. 
Robert Bryan PORTER, Appellant, 
tml 
Richard Scott Buntain, and each of 
them, Defendant 
No. 12087-5-1. 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 1. 
Jan. 16, 1984. 
Rehearing Denied March 7,1984. 
Defendant was convicted in the Superi-
or Court, King County, George Revelle, J., 
of first-degree arson, and he appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Scholfield, J., held that 
the trial court did not err in declining to 
rule on defendant's motion in limine to ex-
clude a prior conviction before the State 
had rested its case in chief and, though 
defendant was entitled to a ruling before he 
took the stand, he waived his right to a 
 timely rujing when he proceeded to testify 
about his prior conviction on direct exami-
nation without renewing his motion, thus 
precluding the trial court from ruling on 
the motion at a time when the refusal to 
rule would have been error. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law c=>632(4) 
A motion in limine is the proper proce-
dure to obtain an early ruling on the admis-
sibility of prior convictions and, though an 
early ruling is helpful to both parties and 
avoids interruption on proceedings before 
the jury, there is no requirement that the 
trial court make such a ruling before the 
defendant takes the witness stand. 
2. Criminal Law c=>632(4) 
It is reasonable and proper for a trial 
court to defer its ruling on a motion in 
limine to exclude prior convictions until it 
knows enough about the case to be able to 
make an intelligent decision. 
3. Criminal Law c=>706(5) 
Until the trial court has ruled on a 
motion in limine to exclude prior convic-
tions, any question relating to those convic-
tions should not be asked in the presence of 
the jury. 
4. Criminal Law c=>632(4) 
The trial court did not err in declining 
to rule on defendant's motion in limine to 
exclude a prior conviction before the State 
had rested its case in chief and, though 
defendant was entitled to a ruling before he 
took the stand, he waived his right to a 
timely ruling when he proceeded to testify 
about his prior conviction on direct exami-
nation without renewing his motion, thus 
precluding the trial court from ruling on 
the motion at a time when the refusal to 
rule would have been error. 
5. Criminal Law ®=*632(4) 
A trial court should not defer ruling on 
a timely motion in limine to exclude prior 
